FRAMING CLIMATE CHANGE INDUCED DISPLACEMENT:

CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND SOLUTIONS

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ABSTRACT

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SYDNEY M. SHEVAT

Global temperatures are rising, leading to extreme weather phenomena all over the world, but especially in non-industrialized nations. These extreme weather events cause mass migration from countries that are being hit the hardest by climate change. Although climate displacement is discussed in some of the criminological literature on climate change and migration, climate change induced displacement (CCID) remains under-examined within criminology. To contribute to the criminological literature, I designed a qualitative research project to explore how representatives of climate organizations and migration organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to climate displacement. In my analysis of these interviews, I found several interesting points of overlap between responses from representatives of climate organizations and those who work at migration organizations, such as a common lack of focus on climate displacement, a framing of climate displacement as the responsibility of nation-states and corporations, and the need to elevate migrant voices in the political and social arenas. I also consider how the information I gained from organization representatives connects to the criminological literature on climate change and mobility; interesting discoveries include the common focus on state-corporate crime as a cause of climate displacement, geopolitical conflicts leading to or following climate disasters, and change from below solutions. The conclusion features some of my key findings, areas for future research, and implications for social change, including the importance of public criminology for reframing climate displacement, and the value of elevating migrant voices to promote a greater understanding of the causes, consequences, and solutions of climate change induced displacement.

Acknowledgments

Northern Arizona University (NAU) sits on homelands sacred to Indigenous peoples throughout the area. These lands, which are still inhabited by Indigenous peoples, border mountains and other terrain sacred to Native people. I honor the Indigenous peoples who call this place home, and those who have been displaced through systems of oppression, systems which have allowed me to be on this land and write this thesis.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

As global temperatures rise, more and more people are being displaced by climate change (Atapattu, 2020; Brisman, 2019). My thesis research explores climate displacement as an effect of climate change that warrants greater criminological attention. I consider how climate change induced displacement (CCID) is framed within criminology by examining the criminological literature on climate change and the literature on migration that has focused on climate displacement. I draw on this literature to design an original research project that explores how climate organizations and migration organizations frame the causes consequences and solutions to CCID. In the chapters that follow, I describe what I learned from the interviews I conducted and also use the findings to consider how my research can inform public criminology, organizations, and social action. To begin, it is important to explain why CCID is an important criminological concern and how I came to study CCID.

Statement of the Problem: Global Warming, Displacement, and Criminology

Global temperatures are rising, leading to extreme weather phenomena all over the world, but especially in non-industrialized nations (Atapattu, 2020). These extreme weather events cause mass migration from countries that are being hit the hardest by climate change (Fernández & Finch, 2013). Climate change is the leading factor behind forced displacement in modern times, exacerbating issues of bordering and border security (Atapattu, 2020; Miller, 2017, 2021). CCID is the process by which people flee their homes due to environmental destruction and extreme weather phenomena. As stated by Brisman et al. (2018a, p. 301), "rampant industrialization has created new victims, with entire populations dislocated by human-induced global warming and climate change." Current research shows that the total number of displaced people will be as high as 1.5 billion by 2050 (Aas & Gundhus, 2015; Atapattu, 2020). People

who are displaced may have to make a dangerous trek across national borders to seek environmentally safe locations (Goldsmith et al., 2016; Fernández & Finch, 2013). Harms brought on due to displacement include loss of culture, economic insecurity, dwindling food and water resources, and the destruction of homes and livelihoods (Brisman et al., 2018a). Given the rise of CCID globally, it is my view that it is essential to devote greater criminological attention to this topic.

Although climate displacement is discussed in some of the green criminological literature, CCID is under-examined within the mainstream criminological literature. Green criminologists have emphasized that climate displacement is felt most by those who contribute to climate change the least (Brisman, 2019; Brisman et al., 2015; South, 2010). In this thesis, I seek to add to the existing body of criminological research on climate change and displacement and to contribute to the development of more comprehensive and effective solutions to CCID.

I decided to focus my primary research on how organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to climate displacement because people who work in migration organizations and climate organizations are at the forefront of engagement with CCID. Those who work in migration organizations are on the ground in the borderlands every day and have direct contact with people who have been displaced by climate change, while those working in climate organizations understand the climate science behind CCID. Further, I have heard from people, especially in the climate justice movement, that the way climate change is framed matters. For example, when climate change is framed as a crisis, it promotes a doomsday mindset that discourages people from taking action against climate change and the resulting displacement. I want to explore how organizations frame CCID to better understand how to encourage people to take action in social movements against climate displacement.

There is little criminological research that examines how organizations at the forefront of climate displacement frame and respond to CCID. The way organizations view climate displacement is important for understanding how these organizations create solutions to CCID, as well as how they motivate people to take action against it. To understand how climate organizations and migration organizations view the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID, I conducted a qualitative study involving representatives from climate organizations and migration organizations. I conducted six interviews with key staff who work in climate organizations and six interviews with staff in migration organizations to better understand how these organizations view the causes and consequences of CCID and the strategies they suggest for responding to the issue of climate displacement. During these interviews, I was able to speak with representatives from organizations that focused on issues at the local, national, and global scales. In my analysis of the research findings, I compare how climate organizations and migration organizations frame CCID and how they seek to respond to climate displacement, identifying areas of difference and overlap in the framings and proposed solutions to CCID. My original study adds to the existing body of research on CCID within criminology because current literature does not often focus on comparing climate organizations and migration organizations, and, to my knowledge, no research has examined how these two kinds of organizations frame and respond to CCID.

In this section, I identified CCID as a significant criminological concern and described how I came to study CCID, including my choice to focus on those who work in migration organizations and climate organizations.

Public Criminology

As an activist scholar, creating change through research is a pivotal part of my thesis project and choice of focus. The concept that criminologists should work to create social change through research is known as "public criminology" (Kramer, 2020). Public criminology asks criminologists to engage in policy and system change within their local communities (Blaustein et al., 2018; Currie, 2007; Kramer, 2020). Public criminology seeks to foster change by seeking out non-academic spaces and engaging those audiences with information about important social problems, such as the environmental issues that lead to displacement. These audiences may include victims of state-corporate crime, environmental organizations, the international political community, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), state agents, the media, and other groups of people (Kramer, 2020). Criminologists can engage in traditional public criminology or organic public criminology (Burawoy, 2007; Kramer, 2020). Traditional public criminology calls for criminologists to bring attention to social justice issues through activities like writing books, giving speeches, and being academic experts in the media (Burawoy, 2007; Kramer, 2020). Organic public criminology requires criminologists to take an active role in a social movement or community organizing (Burawoy, 2007; Kramer, 2020). Both forms of public criminology allow the criminologist to engage with community members to share knowledge of social justice issues, and how to best combat those issues (Kramer, 2020).

With this study, I seek to engage in both traditional and organic public criminology. As a local social justice organizer, I plan to use the knowledge I have gained through this research to motivate more people to take action in organizations and in their communities. Using the information gathered from representatives of climate and migration organizations, I hope to not only present research on climate displacement in the academic or political arenas but to also

bring this research into social justice events regarding migration and climate change. Public support for social justice issues is extremely important for the movement to gain momentum.

Thesis Roadmap

In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I identify the key literatures I utilized in my thesis. Then, in Chapter 3, I outline my qualitative research strategy. Next, in Chapter 4, I provide my research findings and engage in analysis of those findings by comparing the responses of climate and migration organization representatives, as well as by considering their responses in view of the criminological literature. Finally, I consider my key findings and discoveries and offer insights into future research and implications for social change.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

In this chapter, I describe the literatures that informed my research project on framing climate change induced displacement. I first discuss the importance of the literature on framing and social movements, arguing that how a social issue is framed is very important for promoting social movement activities (Gamson, 1992). I then review the criminological literature on CCID. In this literature review, I identify some of the broad themes about CCID found within criminological scholarship on climate change and within criminological scholarship on migration. Some of the specific literatures that I will examine in this chapter include the scholarly work on the historical context behind the climate and migration movements in the United States, with a focus on the important concept of "framing"; literature that discusses climate change, as well as migration and bordering; literature on human rights and climate refugees; and literature that explores solutions to CCID from criminology and migration researchers. For the sake of readability, I have separated the literature review into two sections: migration and climate change. However, it is important to note at the outset that there was a lot of overlap in the themes found in the literature on CCID by researchers studying climate change and researchers studying migration, a point I return to toward the end of this chapter.

Literature on Social Movements and Framing

The framing of social issues is essential for understanding what motivates people to take action against an injustice (Gamson, 1992). I have engaged in organizing social justice events within the climate justice, racial justice, and gender justice movements. While organizing and executing these events over the past several years, I have noticed that people have become apathetic to environmental issues. Many people that I have spoken to about this apathy say that the framing of climate change as a crisis has created a doomsday mindset where reversing

climate change seems impossible. The doomsday mindset that came from the crisis narrative of climate change has led to people withdrawing from local activism due to the constant feeling that climate change is unavoidable. Through this research, I hoped to better understand how the framing of social issues can promote public engagement.

Framing is the deliberate injection of information that can influence how situations, objects, events, experiences, and actions are perceived (Aslandis, 2012; Snow & Benford, 1992). Framing plays an active role in mobilizing resources, responding to opportunities and threats, and influencing communication within and about a social movement (Knight & Greenberg, 2011; Taylor, 2000). Some of the social movement literature refers to collective action frames (Aslanidis, 2012; Snow & Benford, 1992). Collective action frames are sets of beliefs that motivate people to act on a social issue (Gamson, 1992). Collective action frames also give legitimacy to social movements, which emphasizes the significance of social movement activities (Gamson, 1992). For collective action frames to be incorporated within mainstream social movements, Gamson (1992) argues that injustice, identity, and agency must be discussed within social movement organizations. Injustice refers to influencing a group of people to socially construct an issue as harmful or as an injustice (Aslandis, 2012; Benford, 1997; Gamson 1992). Injustice, or perceived injustice, is useful for providing a moral excuse for the groups' actions (Aslandis, 2012; Benford, 1997; Gamson 1992). Identity is important within social movements to create solidarity for or against an injustice (Aslandis, 2012; Friedman & McAdam, 1992; Gamson, 1992). Lastly, agency is crucial within social movements to convince participants that personal involvement in the movement can influence the injustice (Aslandis, 2012; Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1984).

How an issue is framed shapes and reflects understandings of causes and consequences, as well as possible solutions. For example, the current literature on framing CCID within social movements has offered a valuable critique of crisis or emergency frames, which have become very common with respect to CCID (Teso Alonso et al., 2021; Narang, 2017). Crisis frames and alarmist narratives are used often on social media platforms and news media sites to instill a sense of urgency about an issue (Teso Alonso et al., 2021; Narang, 2017). Many times, news media sources report on climate change without including a solution or call to action (Teso Alonso et al., 2021).

Scholars argue that crisis frames and alarmist narratives regarding CCID misunderstand the causes of CCID and have many harmful impacts. Some argue that crisis frames benefit the interests of national security organizations and threaten international cooperation in developing initiatives to respond to CCID (Narang, 2017; Penny, 2007). National security organizations view CCID as a "threat multiplier," and they believe CCID will lead to geopolitical tension and anxiety (Narang, 2017; Podesta & Ogden, 2007). As a result, nation-states are fortifying their borders out of fear there will be an influx of climate refugees seeking safety within their country, as well as an increase in tension given natural resources (Narang, 2017).

Given the adverse consequences associated with crisis frames, it is important to identify alternative ways of framing CCID. For example, one alternative framework to describe CCID is the "slow violence" frame. Slow violence is the idea that the environmental harm associated with climate change, pollution, and warfare are gradually unfolding events that are typically out of sight (Nixon, 2011; Wonders, 2018). Slow violence is typically not viewed as violence due to its delayed nature (Nixon, 2011; Rezwana & Pain, 2021; Wonders, 2018). As a result, environmental harm may appear as an immediate and chronic crisis, rather than an injustice that

has been occurring across time and space (Rezwana & Pain, 2021). As Wonders (2018) argues, the slow violence frame calls for people to recognize that the intersection of politics and economics can be a catalyst for harm, risks, and violence associated with climate change. To address these risks related to climate change, the drivers of inequality and violence must be examined at the political level and within social justice movements (Wonders, 2018). It is important to recognize climate displacement as slow violence to help reject the doomsday mindset associated with the crisis narrative.

Migration

In this section, I focus on broad themes about the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID found within criminological and social science scholarship on migration. I begin by describing how migration is framed within the literature on social movements since that work specifically discusses what frames have been used to mobilize action. Then, I explore the criminological scholarship on the causes and consequences of migration, including research that highlights battles over natural resources as a cause for increased migration and bordering, and research that describes how migrant bodies have become criminalized on a global scale as a consequence of climate displacement. Finally, I delve into solutions to CCID suggested within the literature on migration.

Framing Migration

The framing of migration in the social movement literature is important for understanding how and why people feel motivated to engage in migration activism. Much of the literature on social movements discusses the historical context of how social movements came to be (Goldman, 2018; Dinerstein & Motta, 2017; Sapiro, 2020). The social movement surrounding migration involves addressing public attitudes towards people who migrate, as well as inciting

change in national policies and economies (Ålund & Schierup, 2018; Jobin-Leeds, 2016). Migration organizations seek to discuss issues around human rights, labor rights, sustainable development, and the exploitation of people who migrate (Ålund & Schierup, 2018). To change longstanding notions about migration and people who migrate, activists and organizations seek to build upon past immigrant and non-immigrant organizers who have fought against migration policies and practices in industrialized nation-states (Jobin-Leeds, 2016). Migration activists and organizations pull inspiration from the Arab Spring Revolution, the Latino-led labor union for migrant workers, Martin Luther King Jr. and the Civil Rights movement, the National Farm Workers Association, and the resistance in Serbia in 2009 to create their own social movement specific to migration. (Jobin-Leeds, 2016). Using personal stories of migration has been a successful strategy employed by the social movement to gain traction in public opinion (Jobin-Leeds, 2016).

Some migration scholars frame migration as a human rights issue (Aas & Gundhus, 2015). Traditional bordering and detention practices may lead to human rights issues, such as migrant mortality (Aas & Gundhus, 2015; Weber & Pickering, 2011). As stated by Aas and Gundhus (2015, p. 13), humanitarian reasoning governs whether issues of "suffering, inequality, and need" are resolved or exacerbated by the treatment of migrant people at the border. The notion that migrant people are treated both humanely and inhumanely at different parts of the border by agents of border patrol is called "humanitarian borderlands" (Aas & Gundhus, 2015, p. 12). Migration scholars who frame migration as a human rights issue call for border patrol agencies to accurately record acts of abuse at the border, such as migrant mortality (Aas & Gundhus, 2015).

In this section, I discussed literature on the importance of framing migration within social movements to promote public engagement with activism. In the next section, I examine some of the themes criminologists who study migration have identified as important for understanding the causes and consequences of CCID, which includes a focus on bordering as a social construct used to restrict mobility for migrant populations.

Bordering as a Social Construct

Bordering is an exclusionary state practice that restricts mobility and agency for minoritized people (Mountz et al., 2013; Wonders and Jones, 2019; Wonders and Jones, 2021). Modern bordering is an expression of inclusionary and exclusionary methods to define and direct the movement of people, especially those experiencing poverty and those from the Global South who are disproportionately affected by CCID (Hatuka, 2012; Miller, 2021).

Since the United Nations (UN) recognized climate change as a global issue in 1992, modern nation-states began competing to build larger and stronger border walls (Hatuka, 2012; Miller, 2021). According to journalist Todd Miller (2021), over fifty-five border walls have been constructed since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. As a result, borders have become increasingly more dangerous to cross. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made tremendous efforts to retain and limit access to natural and social resources within the United States border through the fortification of borders (Miller, 2017, 2021; Parenti, 2011). It is known within DHS that the effects of climate change will cause struggles among individuals, as well as conflicts between nation-states over scarce resources (Miller, 2017, 2021; Parenti, 2011).

Some scholars argue that the fortification of borders is not only about criminalizing migrant bodies but is also a way to retain the resources prevalent within the border (Miller, 2017, 2021; Parenti, 2011). Bordering as a way to retain resources foreshadows future climate battles

taking place across national borders (Miller, 2017, 2021; Parenti, 2011). Political-economic elites residing in industrialized nation-states push for the fortification of borders to ensure that their assets will be safer when the effects of global warming become unavoidable (Miller, 2017). In many Western nations, the fortification of border walls has been followed by increased exclusion of all non-citizens.

Restricting access to citizenship is one strategy for excluding access to both social and natural resources. Citizenship is a social construct that creates a continuum, with citizens being privileged on one end, and non-citizens and irregular migrants being viewed as undesirable and marginalized on the other (Wonders, 2006; Wonders and Jones, 2019, 2021). Citizenship can be defined as a "dynamic concept that frames inhabitants 'sets of rights in a particular place" (Hatuka, 2012, p. 347). Nation-states have moved from immigration policies that regulate migrant flows to a system that criminalizes people who attempt to migrate to a Westernized nation-state (Wonders, 2006; Wonders and Jones, 2019, 2021; Van Houtum, 2010). This shift in policy has created an "illegalized global underclass" that is criminalized and penalized as serious offenders of the law (Wonders and Jones, 2019, p. 3). The illegality of those looking to migrate to another country is a produced label that is forced upon people who might better be considered climate refugees (Wonders and Jones, 2019, 2021).

Another useful concept within the migration literature is the notion of global apartheid. Global apartheid is the concept that the Global North is actively controlling and restricting the mobility of people in the Global South (Chomsky, 2014; Van Houtum, 2010). The level of mobility a person is granted is a reflection of their social status (Chomsky, 2014; Van Houtum, 2010). A person's wealth, income, race, gender, and citizenship all intersect to affect their placement in the hierarchy of society. People at the top of the hierarchy, political-economic

elites, are allowed more opportunities for success in comparison to those at the bottom of the hierarchy of society (Chomsky, 2014; Van Houtum, 2010). Opportunities awarded to political-economic elites include access to education, employment, and safe living and working conditions. Individuals that hold little political-economic power, such as people fleeing climate disasters, do not have the same opportunities due to structural inequalities produced and maintained by political-economic elites. The migration literature emphasizes that hierarchies within society translate into hierarchies of mobility (Wonders and Jones, 2021).

In this section, I discussed some of the literature that argues that the fortification of borders is a direct result of impending climate wars for natural resources and is also a strategy for facilitating bordering and global apartheid. In the next section, I discuss the literature on the criminalization of migration.

Criminalizing the Migrant Body

A growing body of literature argues that borders create and reinforce the social construction of people as legal and illegal, or alien and non-alien (Franko Aas & Gundhus, 2015; Mountz et al., 2013; Van Houtum, 2010; Wonders and Jones, 2019). Borders represent a separation between those who are wanted and favored (citizens) by a nation and those who are unwanted and disfavored (individuals who are migrants) (Franko Aas & Gundhus, 2015; Mountz et al., 2013; Van Houtum, 2010). Industrialized nations use "traditional policing modus" when constructing their border security (Franko Aas & Gundhus, 2015, p. 7). In this modus, borders and detention practices are used as a way to control who is allowed free mobility (Franko Aas & Gundhus, 2015; Mountz et al., 2013; Van Houtum, 2010). As many scholars have emphasized, mobility regimes are racialized; White bodies are deemed free to travel without restraint, while

Brown, Black, and poor bodies are subjected to deterrence and detainment when they attempt to exercise their mobility (Franko Aas & Gundhus, 2015; Mountz et al., 2013; Van Houtum, 2010).

Further, scholars have established that globalization has made borders porous for manufactured products and White bodies, while borders are, at best, "semi-permeable," and often entirely closed for many people trying to escape climate disasters (Wonders, 2006; Wonders, 2018). Nation-states seek to limit the mobility of minoritized bodies out of fear that claims to citizenship will arise and also to ensure a precarious workforce (Wonders & Jones, 2019, 2021).

Those who successfully cross international borders in search of environmentally safer locations are often categorized and villainized as the "other" (Milivojevic & Radulski, 2020). The "other" is a label placed on people who have been historically marginalized from society by the dominant party (Franko, 2020; McDowell & Wonders, 2009; Milivojevic & Radulski, 2020). Historically marginalized groups may include people of minoritized ethnicity, religion, social status, race, gender, sexuality, disability, or people who lack citizenship (Milivojevic & Radulski, 2020). People displaced by climate change are disproportionately racially minoritized, poor individuals from the Global South who lack citizenship in the wealthier countries of the Global North. Marginalized global communities, such as refugees or asylum seekers, have been expelled to the fringes of society and labeled as "other" (Franko, 2020; Milivojevic & Radulski, 2020; Sassen, 2016).

People who are placed into the "other" category often face increased surveillance which reinforces and exacerbates existing inequalities (Franko, 2020; Milivojevic & Radulski, 2020; Welch & Shuster, 2005). People in the "other" category are more likely to be targeted in surveillance schemes and face the risk of increased criminalization due to constant and discriminatory monitoring (Franko, 2020; Milivojevic & Radulski, 2020). Surveillance of

climate refugees allows states to more easily determine where, how, and upon whom borders will

be performed, allowing the Global North to keep unwanted populations from entering their

borders (McDowell & Wonders, 2009).

Surveillance of mobile populations has emerged as a preferred method for strengthening

border security (McDowell & Wonders, 2009; Milivojevic & Radulski, 2020; Pickering &

Weber, 2006). Nation-states are utilizing technical, punitive, and innovative methods of border

patrol in an attempt to control the migrant population (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007; McDowell

& Wonders, 2009). These border patrol methods, known as "technologies of control," are

employed in the Global North's fight against immigration (Pickering & Weber, 2006).

Technologies of control are used to locate, detain, and deport people suspected of "illegal"

migration, while also being used to exclude people who lack citizenship from access to important

social institutions, such as the labor or housing markets (Broeders & Engersen, 2007; McDowell

& Wonders, 2009).

Technologies of control reinforce the label of the "other" through practices of

banishment, exclusion, and expulsion (Aas, 2007; Franko, 2020; Sassen, 2016). The Global

North has transformed itself into a disciplinary state; drawing on Jeremy Bentham's idea of the

Panopticon, some have called this approach a "Banopticon" (Aas, 2007). The "Banopticon"

refers to instilling the status of exclusion in the minds, bodies, and identities of migrants (Aas,

2007; Engbersen, 2001). Due to the self-discipline instilled by the "Banopticon," migrants

constantly feel the pressure of surveillance and exclusion by law enforcement agents and

government workers (McDowell & Wonders, 2009). This pressure of constantly feeling watched

instills a sense of wrongdoing in the minds of people who migrate, including those displaced by

climate change. This sense of wrong-doing produced by the technologies of control may prevent

people seeking environmentally safer locations from entering the borders of the Global North or from seeking safe refuge. Those facing environmental harm are made more vulnerable to the risks and injuries associated with climate change. This section discussed the criminalization of migrant bodies, how globalization has affected border security, and how surveillance has become the preferred method of border security in the Global North. In the next section, I review some of the solutions to CCID found within the literature on migration.

Solutions to Climate Displacement from Migration Literature

There is a lack of literature on solutions and adaptation strategies to CCID found within criminological scholarship on migration and migration organizations. Migration researchers focus mainly on adaptation strategies to CCID, rather than preventative action against climate change (Elie, 2022; Pentlow, 2020). These strategies include physically moving as an adaptation and employing strategies to adapt to new agricultural methods (Elie, 2022; Pentlow, 2020). These methods include growing different crops or growing certain crops at different times of the year and creating human-made water reservoirs for when water is scarce (Pentlow, 2020).

Further, Brisman (2019) states that telling stories about climate change and displacement can help people to understand who they are, who they are not, and how to proceed in certain situations. Brisman (2019) discusses *The Three Little Pigs* as a story about climate change. Through telling this story, Brisman (2019) sought to show how climate change and displacement can be understood through fables and stories. By interpreting *The Three Little Pigs* as a story about climate change, people can decide whether they want to help those suffering from climate displacement or promote the building of border walls to keep those displaced out by seeing how the characters respond to the situation in the story (Brisman, 2019). If people do "adapt their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors based on what they may have read," then interpreting *The Three*

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Little Pigs as a story about climate change may help people understand how to respond to the issues of climate change, bordering, and displacement.

Another solution to CCID from the literature on migration includes "change from below" as a strategy to achieve transnational justice regarding migration and climate displacement. This method requires migrants and climate refugees to use their agency to combat borders as they cross them (Piven, 2008; Wonders & Jones, 2019). This solution calls for climate refugees to rid themselves of the "Banopticon" mind frame and reconstruct themselves as worthy of human rights (Aas, 2007; Piven, 2008; Wonders & Jones, 2019). This reconstruction of identity by people displaced by climate change and social justice organizations can create political pressure for widespread normative and cultural acceptance of border crossing. Organizations, such as in the climate change and migration arenas, can promote the acceptance of border crossing to help solidify the change in public opinion and policy. Eventually, this acceptance can lead to policy change that reflects the newly constructed norm of border crossing (Wonders & Jones, 2019, 2021).

This section detailed solutions to CCID found within literature on migration. The next section delves into literature on climate change. In the next section, I focus on several broad themes the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID found within the criminological literature on climate change.

Climate Change

I first discuss how climate change is framed within the social movement literature to consider how framing is linked to climate-related activism. Then I delve into the criminological literature that examines some of the causes and consequences of climate change, including scholarship that discusses how environmental harm is used by nation-states to justify border

fortification and scholarship that examines the lack of international law and policy related to climate displacement. Finally, I outline solutions to climate displacement found within the literature on climate change.

Framing of Climate Change

The social movement literature on the framing of climate change reveals that climate organizations often utilize marches and public demonstrations to raise awareness of environmentally damaging actions. Rather than focusing on policy change, climate activists typically focus on a system change, such as a radical shift away from capitalism to a more sustainable form of economy (Beer, 2022; Kramer, 2020; Lynch et al., 2017).

Many criminologists view climate change as largely caused by capitalism and state-corporate crime (Kramer, 2020; Kramer & Michalowski, 2012). Further, some criminologists use crisis frames to describe the severity of climate change, which further perpetuates the doomsday mindset (Kramer, 2020).

This section explored how criminologists view climate change and the resulting displacement. The next section discusses climate change as a result of state-corporate crime.

Climate Change as State-Corporate Crime

Criminological attention to climate change and climate-induced displacement is relatively recent. The existing literature focuses on several important themes, including state-corporate crime and the failure of nation-states to address climate change. The literature on criminology and climate change shows that many countries lack adequate environmental protections (Bettini et al., 2017; de Wit, 2021; Fornalé & Doebbler, 2017). Some criminologists argue that the unwillingness of nation-states to address climate change could be considered a state-corporate crime of omission. For example, Michalowski and Kramer's (2006) theory of state-corporate

crime examines how political and economic interests often coincide. In this relationship, political-economic elites often work toward the same goals which include maintaining the current social order (Michalowski & Kramer, 2006; Kramer 2020). The current social order entails promoting neoliberal capitalism through "systems of exploitation such as capitalism, fascism, or communism" that advantage political economic elites and disadvantage minoritized populations (Michalowski & Kramer, 2006, p. 5). This shared vision of social order may result in widespread social and physical injury, as seen in the destruction caused by anthropogenic climate change (Kramer & Michalowski, 2012).

To maintain the existing fossil-fuel dependent, capitalist social order, nation-states and corporations may knowingly or unknowingly cause widespread social and physical harm (Kramer & Michalowski, 2012; Michalowski & Kramer, 2006; Kramer 2020). Climate change and CCID are state-corporate crimes because transnational corporations, particularly in the fossil fuel industry, and the nation-states of the Global North, act in concert in ways that, intentionally and unintentionally, cause widespread environmental and social harm (Kramer & Michalowski, 2012). Corporate and state actors interact with each other and create harm in four ways: by denying that global warming is caused by human activity, blocking efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, excluding progressive, ecological adaptions to climate change from the political arena, and responding to the social conflicts that arise from climate change by transforming themselves into untouchable societies that will not be affected by the collapse that follows climate change (Kramer & Michalowski, 2012).

Kramer and Michalowski (2012) argue that climate change is shaped by two forms of state-corporate crime. The first of these forms concerns the failure of nation-states and corporations to reduce the production of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (Kramer &

Michalowksi, 2012). The other failure stems from a lack of adaptation policies. Adaptation is the process of adjusting or preparing to live with the effects of climate change that are already occurring or will occur in the future (Kramer & Michalowksi, 2012). Both failures are state-corporate crimes of omission. State-corporate crimes of omission occur when governments and corporations cause social and physical injury by failing to act on an issue (Kramer & Michalowksi, 2012; Michalowski & Kramer, 2006). By failing to address climate change, governments and large corporations bear responsibility for the growing number of people that are displaced by extreme weather events and natural disasters.

Environmental Harm and Border Security

Much like the literature on migration, a great deal of the contemporary criminological literature on climate change discusses how environmental harm exacerbates issues of bordering and border security (Kramer, 2020; White, 2014). Climate displacement is often described as a crisis and climate refugees are often met by military-trained border patrol while attempting to cross national lines (White, 2014).

White (2014) discusses these dynamics in detail, including the political, economic, and environmental issues related to heightened border security and the rise of a fortress mentality. Increased resource use is related to the fortification of physical and social borders in anticipation of elevated conflict between people, groups, and nations for resources (Brisman, 2013; Kramer, 2020; White, 2014). Although the research on climate change has clearly established the threat of a climate catastrophe, nation-states have failed to create effective mitigation or adaptation plans (Kramer and Michalowski, 2012; White, 2014). The literature suggests that increased border security makes it more difficult for people displaced by climate change to seek safety from

environmental harm. In this section, I discussed literature that focuses on the fortification of borders due to environmental insecurity and degradation.

Climate Refugees and the Absence of Human Rights Protections

This section focuses on the criminological literature that discusses climate refugees and the lack of international law and policy related to climate change and displacement. In some contexts, people who cross borders are protected under international asylum law, including in the United Nations (UN) 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the UN Office to the African Union (OAU) 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, or the UN 1984 Cartagena Declaration of Refugees in the Americas (Bilak & Kälin, 2022; Fornalé & Doebbler, 2017; Garlick & Michal, 2022; Vitorino, 2022). These statutes protect people who are displaced from their home nations due to state-sanctioned persecution or violence resulting in a disturbed public order (Bilak & Kälin, 2022; Fornalé & Doebbler, 2017; Garlick & Michal, 2022). However, these laws do not explicitly protect people who are being affected by environmental harm.

Environmental harm may lead to violence and a disturbed public order due to natural resource depletion, climate wars, food and water insecurity, and extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, and wildfires (Agnew 2012; Brisman, 2013; Brisman et al., 2018a; White, 2014). Resource scarcity can result in social and physical conflict, as well as climate wars for control over the remaining resources (Brisman, 2013; Brisman et al., 2018a; White, 2014; Zimmerer 2014). These disturbances to public order may make people feel that they must cross international borders in search of an environmentally safer location (Agnew 2012; Brisman et al., 2018b). Framing environmental degradation as a threat to public order would require nation-states to award rights and protections to people displaced by climate change.

Each year, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) hosts a Conference of Parties (COP) meeting to discuss climate change, sustainability, and human rights related to environmental harm (Bilak & Kälin, 2022). At COP16 in 2010, nation-states promoted climate migration as the best adaptation strategy to climate displacement (Bilak & Kälin, 2022). Although nation-states belonging to the UN have viewed migration as the best adaptation strategy to climate change since 2010, many nations have not welcomed refugees who have utilized migration as an adaptation to environmental harm (Bilak & Kälin, 2022). The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) was created in 2015 at COP21 to examine approaches to minimize and address climate displacement (Bilak & Kälin, 2022). At the COP24 meeting, it was agreed that WIM was necessary to reduce climate displacement and even adopted the UN Global Compact on Migration (GCM). The UN GCM developed commitments and recommendations to prevent climate change-induced migration (Bilak & Kälin, 2022). Some nation-states have begun implementing strategies outlined by WIM and GCM to address climate displacement, but not enough nations have participated to make a difference in the development of international rights and protections for climate refugees (Bilak & Kälin, 2022). As there is a lack of international law and policy protecting climate refugees as asylum seekers, it is important to consider solutions to CCID beyond legislative action. This section explored the absence of rights and protections for climate refugees in international law and policy. In the next section, I discuss some of the solutions to CCID prevalent in the literature on climate change.

Solutions to Climate Displacement from Climate Change Literature

Criminologists who study global warming focus first on the environment and climate change as the solution to addressing CCID. They tend to argue that if anthropogenic environmental degradation was addressed on a global scale, the need to migrate from one's

country due to climate change would become unnecessary. Although it is known within climate science that climate change is an anthropogenic issue, human-caused greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise (Lynch et al., 2017; Parenti, 2011). The first step in ending CCID would be to mitigate carbon emissions (Lynch et al., 2017; Parenti, 2014). To achieve this, the U.S. and other wealthy countries could invest in clean energy and electric vehicles, modernize buildings to be more energy-efficient and sustainable, and have a mandatory agreement among nation-states to lower greenhouse gas emissions (Parenti, 2014).

Along with this, some criminological literature promotes the criminalization of environmental harm as a way to combat climate change, and presumably, climate displacement (Cook, Short, & South, 2018). Cook, Short, & South (2018) argue that in order to combat climate change, a radical revision must be made to the human legal system to include environmental harm as a criminalizable act. Making environmental damage, or ecocide, an international crime would create a new set of legal norms and precedents that would allow political-economic elites to be criminalized for their role in climate change and displacement.

Another solution to climate change, and presumably CCID, found within criminological literature involves a governmental and economic system change. Creating an "ecological revolution" in the political economy of the Global North is needed to encourage Westernized nation-states to create adequate environmental policies and protections (Kramer, 2020, p. 226). One way to promote this revolution is through the Green New Deal, which emphasizes ending the capitalist political economy in favor of an economic plan capable of achieving carbon neutrality while also promoting economic and environmental equality (Kramer, 2020). The Green New Deal is being discussed specifically in the US but could be implemented in any industrialized nation-state. The Green New Deal would transform fossil capitalism into an eco-

socialist economy, which prioritizes environmental security while discouraging systems of patriarchy, racism, classism, homophobia, and a fossil-fuel-based economy (Angus, 2016). With this new economy, nation-states, even of the Global North, would push to create adequate environmental policies that would eliminate climate crimes and displacement (Kramer, 2020).

Currently, the UN acts as the international body that works to achieve transnational justice through policy change. To adequately achieve transnational justice through policy change, nation-states of the UN must recognize CCID as a threat to public order. Under the UN 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the UN OAU 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, and the UN 1984 Cartagena Declaration of Refugees in the Americas, any person who is displaced due to a disturbed public order is entitled to enter a nation belonging to the UN as an asylum seeker (Bilak & Kälin, 2022; Fornalé & Doebbler, 2017; Garlick & Michal, 2022; Vitorino, 2022). If CCID was framed as a threat to public order, nations belonging to the UN would have to award climate refugees with rights and protections as asylum seekers. More research must be conducted on the definition of "disturbed public order" to decide whether people displaced by climate change should be considered legal refugees under UN statutes.

Some scholars have noted that using the argument that CCID is a threat to public order is not without its consequences (Sajjad, 2018). This argument would effectively label people displaced by climate change as "refugees," which comes with its own negative connotations (Sajjad, 2018). Refugees around the world often face racism and discrimination from people who hold citizenship and are often viewed as cultural and existential threats to the status quo (Sajjad, 2018). People who are labeled as "refugees" become hyper-visible within society and are seen as violating the natural order of society (Sajjad, 2018). As such, people labeled as "refugees"

become synonymous with words such as "illegal," "undocumented," and "criminal" (Sajjad, 2018). These negative connotations risk solidifying the "us versus them" mentality perpetuated by state actors (Sajjad, 2018).

Another local – and potentially global - strategy to combat CCID is through social movements. People worldwide, especially young people, are mobilizing in their local communities to protest climate injustice (Klein, 2019; Kramer, 2020; Piven, 2008). These young people have been named "climate kids," and they aim to take back their future from political-economic elites who seek to gain capital through the excessive use of greenhouse gasses and resource depletion (Hertsgaard, 2019, p. 25; Kramer, 2020, p. 229). Social movements and organizations surrounding climate injustice have gained mass momentum in recent years, and are demanding action be taken against environmental degradation that threatens the future of the planet (Kramer, 2020). This section discussed solutions to climate displacement found within criminological literature on climate change. In the next section, I compare and contrast the criminological literature on mobility and climate change.

Comparing and Contrasting Criminological Work on Migration and Climate Change

Based on my literature review, it appears that researchers who focus primarily on migration and those who focus primarily on climate issues frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to climate change and CCID differently, but with some overlapping themes. Both migration and climate researchers often agree that increased bordering, social exclusion, and surveillance can be linked back to climate change. Literature on migration discusses bordering as a social construct more often than the literature on climate change. The literature on climate change explores the lack of human rights for climate refugees and the need for human rights initiatives to address CCID more frequently than scholars in the migration arena. Migration

scholars often emphasize adaptation strategies to combat displacement, while climate scholars often promote solutions to ending climate change as a way to end CCID. To inform my public criminology approach to CCID, I plan to compare the solutions found in both the criminological literature on migration and literature on climate change to develop and promote comprehensive solutions to CCID from both fields, as well as use the research to motivate people to take action against climate displacement through social movements and organizations. In the next section, I detail my research questions and key themes of this study.

Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Strategy

Introduction

Upon conducting the literature review for this study, I found that many criminological scholars pointed to the crisis framing of climate change as justification for nation-states to fortify their borders in anticipation of climate wars (Brisman et al., 2018b; White, 2014). From my experience as an activist, I found that many climate organizations used the crisis framing of climate change in an attempt to motivate people to take action against environmental harm. Using the crisis frame to increase climate activism tends to have adverse consequences since nation-states are able to use the crisis frame promoted by organizations to justify border fortification and exclusion of people who are displaced. This discovery made me wonder how organizations at the forefront of climate displacement frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID.

Research Questions

In this section, I describe the research questions that guided my thesis research. The research questions I address in my thesis are:

1. How do those who work in climate organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID?

2. How do those who work in migration organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID?

3. What similarities and differences are revealed when the framings provided by those representing different kinds of organizations are compared?

In the following sections, I describe my choice to engage in qualitative research and detail my research strategy, including my data collection method, interview process, analysis plan, and timeline.

Research Strategy

Methodology

For my thesis, I chose to develop a qualitative research study using interviews. From the beginning of the project, I knew I wanted to conduct some form of qualitative fieldwork as "engaging in some number of behaviors relevant to the setting and in face-to-face interaction with its participants" would allow me to gain a deeper understanding of CCID and those who are at the forefront of it (Lofland, 2006, p. 16). As stated in Lofland (2006) and Weiss (1995), interviewing allows a researcher to get an in-depth view of topics and perspectives related to their area of study. I felt that interviewing was the best strategy for this research project as I was seeking an in-depth understanding of how representatives of climate organizations and migration organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID. Being able to speak with people on the ground in the climate and migration arenas allowed me to see and hear the emotions involved in the work that people in organizations perform.

My thesis employs a qualitative study focusing on the perceptions of people who work in organizations that prioritize attention to climate (what I call "climate organizations) and organizations that prioritize attention to migration (which I call "migration organizations"). I collected data through semi-structured interviews with informants in both climate and migration organizations (Lofland, 2006; Weiss, 1995). I conducted 12 interviews to gather data on solutions and frameworks relating to CCID. Before interviewing, I submitted my proposal to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) and obtained permission to collect data from the respondents

(1979032-1). Obtaining IRB approval was an important step in my research to ensure my data collection was ethical and met approved standards for working with human subjects.

I interviewed six representatives of climate organizations and six representatives of migration organizations about how their agency views the causes and consequences of CCID, as well as solutions to CCID prioritized by their organization. These organizations were focused locally, nationally, and/or internationally. I interviewed staff from each kind of organization as I wanted to see how organizations that focus on these different scales view and address CCID. In the end, due to time constraints and insufficient representation at each scale of analysis, I did not specifically focus on how differently scaled organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions, but do note that there are differences and similarities between organizations in the concluding chapter.

This section detailed the research strategy utilized in this study. In the next section, I outline my recruitment strategy, interview process, protection of informants 'confidentiality, my analysis plan, and the limitations of my research design.

Recruitment

For this project, I sought to interview representatives of climate or migration organizations who were 18 years of age or older. Organizations were identified through Google searches using keywords such as "Arizona climate organization," "Arizona migration organization," "United States climate organization," and "United States migration organization" (See Appendix A). Through these searches, a list of local, national, and international climate organizations and migration organizations was assembled that initially included 106 organizations that focus either on the climate or on migration (see Appendix A). Using purposive sampling, I narrowed the list to 40: 20 climate organizations and 20 migration organizations.

Recruitment occurred via telephone, social media, and/or email. The method of contact depended on the contact information available on the organization's website. If the chosen organizations declined to participate, another organization from the list was chosen. I worked through these lists until I secured interviews with six representatives at each kind of organization. I contacted 22 climate organizations and 26 migration organizations in total before securing 12 interview participants. Organizations mentioned time constraints and limited resources as reasons for their unwillingness to participate in my research. The additional organizations I contacted came from the original list of 106 organizations.

I conducted semi-structured interviews with participants via telecommunications (Zoom). In total 12 representatives from 12 different organizations were interviewed (6 from climate organizations, and 6 from migration organizations). It was my intention to interview the director or head of each organization. However, if that was not possible, I spoke with a representative recommended by the organization. I spoke with a variety of people working in migration organizations and climate organizations including a co-founder, directors or board members, coordinators, employees, as well as project developers and organizers.

Once a representative of an organization expressed interest in the study, I sent them an email solidifying the interview date and time; I also attached the Informed Consent Form (ICF). By signing the ICF, participants consented to have the interview recorded on video and audio, permit the interview to be transcribed via Zoom, and allow the name of the organization and the name of the organization to be used in my thesis. The participant was asked to read the consent form, sign it, and return it to me via email. All (12) of the participants signed the consent form to participate, but one organization did not consent to be visually or audio recorded, nor to have their organization's name included in the research project. I then put the signed consent form in

the password-protected computer program (iCloud). Once the ICF was uploaded to the password-protected computer program, I created a private password-protected Zoom meeting link on a date and time that was convenient for the participant. I then sent the Zoom link to the participant.

Interview Process

I began the interview by describing who I am and my research project. I explained that some of the questions may be difficult to answer, and informed participants that they were free to skip a question or end the interview altogether at any time. I reminded them that I am interested in their experiences, opinions, and thoughts on the topic as a representative of the organization where they work and that all information provided will be confidential and kept in a password-protected computer program. I told the participants that they can interrupt me at any time if they need clarification or elaboration. Finally, I asked if they had any questions before the interview began.

Participants were asked about their organization and their expertise as a representative of that organization, specifically, they were asked about how their organization frames and responds to CCID. I created a list of questions to guide the interview, but participants were also able to shape the course of the interview through their responses. The questions that were asked were developed based on the three key research questions that guide my thesis project. The interview protocol (located in Appendix B) is organized into three sections – causes, consequences, and solutions.

The interviews lasted between approximately 30 minutes and an hour and 10 minutes, with the average interview time being approximately 42 minutes. Upon completing the interview, I asked participants if they had any questions or anything else they would like to share

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relating to the research study. I asked participants if they would like to be informed of the study's completion. The respondents that chose to be informed of the study's completion will be notified once the research is complete, and I will share a summary of my research findings. I then thanked the participants for their participation in the study, and the interview concluded. I uploaded the recording of the interview into a password-protected vault. Once uploaded, the recording was deleted from the computer.

Informant Confidentiality

All data collected, including the ICF, Zoom transcription, and audio/visual recording, were uploaded to the password-protected computer program. I compared the Zoom transcription with the audio recording to ensure the transcriptions were accurate. Once an accurate transcription had been verified, I deleted the audio/visual recording from the computer and used an anonymous identifier to label the file ("organization representative X (1-12)."

Analysis Plan

Once collected, the transcripts from the interviews were analyzed using selective and axial coding. I began analyzing the transcriptions by reading through all interviews and noting any recurring themes, specifically, how that organization frames and addresses CCID. I highlighted these topics within the transcripts and then used axial coding to look at common and distinct themes among the interviews (Bachman and Schutt, 2008). Axial coding is a well-regarded tool for the analysis of qualitative data that allowed me to create categories that I used to classify and isolate pertinent information (Bachman and Schutt, 2008).

In my analysis of the interviews, I sought to answer my research questions, while also linking my findings to the existing literature. By comparing how climate organizations and migration organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID, I hoped to

identify commonalities and points of difference in their approaches that might help to inform greater collaboration and more effective solutions to the global problem of CCID.

Limitations

The current study employed 12 semi-structured qualitative interviews with representatives from migration organizations and climate organizations. Although semi-structured interviews permitted an in-depth look into how that organization frames the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID, the interview findings are not generalizable to every migration or climate organization (Lofland, 2006; Weiss, 1995). Many organizations do not have a specific role in combatting CCID, which led to some of the interviews being extremely detailed while others were more superficial. Further, the role of each representative varied between the organizations. During my interviews with the representatives, I spoke with 1 co-founder, 4 directors or board members, 2 employees, and 1 project developer/organizer. Due to the varying roles of each representative, some representatives were able to give more detail than others based on their involvement in the organization.

Reflexivity Statement

Throughout my thesis, it was important for me to examine my own judgments, actions, and beliefs to consider biases that may have affected the research. Parts of my identity, such as being a climate activist, and my personal political views, could have made me predisposed to focus on some responses more than others or to analyze the data toward a certain conclusion. I also needed to ensure that my own perspectives on CCID would not impede my ability to build rapport with the representatives in this study (Muthanna & Alduais, 2023). Throughout this project, I have engaged in prospective and retrospective reflections in an attempt to limit bias (McLeod, 2003; Muthanna & Alduais, 2023). For example, before beginning an interview, I

would look over my interview protocol, reading each question out loud. I did this to ensure that I would not lead the participant in any certain direction by misrepresenting the question. While it is impossible to eliminate bias from social science research entirely. I have tried to consider and limit the effect my personal biases may have had on the outcome of the study by being continuously reflexive and transparent.

In this chapter, I described my methodological approach and research strategy. Next, I turn to the research findings and my analysis.

Chapter 4: Findings and Analysis

This chapter describes and analyzes what I learned from the interviews I conducted with representatives from climate organizations and migration organizations. I detail the information I obtained from representatives of migration organizations and climate organizations separately. For each kind of organization, I first describe the specific organizations included in my research, the titles of the representatives interviewed, and the organizations 'missions. Then, I outline the causes of CCID as framed by the representatives of the organizations. Next, I delve into how representatives framed the consequences and impacts that follow climate displacement, followed by a description of how solutions to climate displacement were framed by organization representatives. After outlining responses from the representatives of each type of organization, I compare and contrast the frames used to describe CCID to identify common themes between how migration organization representatives and climate organization representatives view and frame climate displacement. I also compare these themes to the frames used in the criminological literature on migration and climate change. Throughout the findings section, all direct quotes are written in italics.

Migration Organizations

Participant Organizations, Representatives, and Mission

Overall, six representatives were interviewed from migration organizations. Of these six representatives, a couple (2) of the representatives were directors or board members of the organization, a couple (2) were employees within a program of the organization, one (1) was a coordinator of a specific program within the organization, and one (1) was the co-founder of the organization.

The representatives from each organization were asked to describe their organization's work. According to representatives, many (5) of the organizations had multiple foci in the migration arena. All (6) of the organization representatives stated that they belong to one social movement, with one (1) organization stating that their movement is *part of the fabric of the community*. All (6) organizations serve or advocate for local communities. Serving local communities includes creating and operating humanitarian shelters, conducting food and water drops in migrant corridors, facilitating encounters between migrants and citizens, advocating for migrant rights, funding local organizers to effect change in their communities, and offering pro-bono legal assistance to migrant people.

All (6) organizations engage in work nationally, with two (2) of these organizations engaging in national work only through collaboration with other groups. National work includes visiting universities around the U.S. to educate students on the realities of the borderlands, conducting border trips with politicians, ordinary citizens, and news media people, providing feedback on government programs, advocating for or funding federal public policy change, establishing community banks with governments of other countries, and offering legal help to people across the U.S.

Some (3) of the organizations engaged in work on an international level. Global work includes advocating for public policy in nations other than the U.S., funding education and universities in the Global South, and building community resilience through community development programs in the Global South.

Most (4) of the organizations focus on raising awareness and support of borderland communities. Most (4) of the organizations also focus on providing humanitarian aid by creating/assisting migrant shelters or conducting food and water drops in migrant corridors. In

addition, most (4) of the organizations focus on initiating contact between migrant populations and citizen populations. A few (3) organizations offer financial support to other organizations or local communities serving migrant people. Several (3) organizations 'mission statements involve empowering migrants by assisting in what one respondent described as *bringing dignity to migration*. A few (3) organizations work on community development projects within local communities to prevent migration, and some (3) organizations focus on educating ordinary citizens of the Global North, as well as politicians, on issues that borderlands are facing. One (1) organization offers free legal services for migrant populations. One (1) organization puts pressure on governments and institutions to award migrant people rights and freedoms within the Global North.

The representatives were asked whether their organization had a specific mission regarding CCID. Out of the six migration organizations, none explicitly include climate displacement within their mission statement, but all representatives did consider CCID as a top cause of migration. One representative said:

> *I mean it's encompassed by our mission, which is to promote humane, just, and workable migration. So our vision is migration with dignity. Basically, we serve any migrant person displaced, any person recently expelled, or people in any context of mobility. And we try to meet their needs as a whole.*

While another explained:

> *I met hundreds and hundreds of people fleeing Honduras, after the hurricane. So to me, it is a main focus [of our work]. And climate displacement… This is what we see, and this is what we hear. What breaks my heart is that it does not make them qualify for any of the boxes of refugees or asylum seekers. [The organization] is not really doing anything*

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specifically to remedy that in their countries, because it's huge, and it's just our funding

doesn't get that far.

One (1) organization stated that although the employees of the organization are aware of climate displacement, CCID does not play into their work. The representative stated:

I don't believe the mission statement mentions climate change. We're aware that climate is

a driver in this whole human displacement, but it doesn't become part of our work.

This section described the migration organizations and representatives interviewed for the study. The next section looks at the causes of CCID mentioned by representatives of migration organizations.

Causes

Representatives were asked about what their migration organization would say were the causes of climate displacement. Most (5) organization representatives discussed the causes of climate displacement, while one (1) representative stated that their organization recognizes certain causes of CCID but does not engage in speaking with migrant people about the reasons behind their migration. Most (5) of the organization representatives pointed to economic and security reasons for migrating. These economic and security issues include being unable to grow crops to sell at the market, as well as the fear of violence spurring from the resulting economic hardship. One representative said:

I've had some people tell me that they cannot make enough money because they can't grow

those crops. And, because there's no money going into the community, especially because

of agriculture, they have to go to the United States. That's the only way they can provide

for their families.

Along with this, most (5) migration organization representatives stated that people were unable to grow their crops due to extreme weather conditions such as extreme rain, hurricanes, and flooding. One representative said:

It's either not raining or it's raining at the wrong time. And people's corn fields are not producing, and they're finding themselves in a situation where sometimes it's starvation or food insecurity and they are forced to look for different options.

Some (4) migration organization representatives mentioned drought as a leading cause of climate displacement. One representative said:

Most of them tell us that they leave home because they can't make a living. Well, usually, when you can't make a living, it's because you can't grow your crops. You don't have water.

A couple (2) representatives pointed to corporations outsourcing labor and production to nations of the Global South. One representative said:

In my home state Gualala, it's in northeast Mexico, there were companies that settled there, like from the milk industry. And also one that's called Penoles; they work with construction and everything. That region of Gualala used to be called La Laguna, like The Lagoon, because there was a huge lagoon. And nowadays it doesn't make sense for the name, because it's completely dried out by these companies that arrived there. And a lot of people rely on working in the fields with cotton and other agriculture, but it's completely dried out now. And these two companies settled in that place because the government allowed it in order to create investment and job opportunities and everything.

One (1) migration organization representative mentioned state-sanctioned dumping of toxic materials as a cause of climate displacement. One representative said:

I was talking to a woman who was almost 80, and she survived the Civil War [in El

Salvador]. She lives around the area where this government was sending helicopters that

were packed with car batteries, and just dump them in that land, in that field. So she was

telling me that because of that, [chemicals from the car batteries] drained in the water.

That was her story, it's not that I saw, it's not that I know, this was her story. And she said,

'Because of that, we have the largest number of people dying of kidney failure in my area,

and I have lost my brother, 'she said, 'And my sisters because of that. 'And she said, 'I

remember at midnight they would come and just drop and drop. 'And we're talking about

40 years ago. But the consequences are still there. Because there are still people dying of

kidney failure.

One (1) representative stated that air pollution was a central cause of climate displacement. This representative said:

Well, I am from El Salvador. There is smoke everywhere that you breathe; it's not clean

air. Not having clean air in our countries and a good system that will take care of this. It's

just so extreme.

One (1) migration organization representative stated that melting polar ice caps and rising sea levels were central causes of climate displacement. This representative said:

Small island states are threatened by the rising sea levels, and potentially they are facing a

very bleak future of drawing and disappearing. So we also like looking at mobility from

this angle, this is going to happen to those communities; the entire nation will basically be

displaced. And then also we're looking at the Caribbean with the policy processes

regarding melting polar caps and rising sea levels in different parts of the world.

One (1) organization representative mentioned geopolitical conflicts as a central cause of climate displacement. The representative of the organization used the Syrian War as an example of climate displacement due to geopolitical conflict. This representative stated:

People even have stated that the Civil War in Syria, in many ways, is related to climate change. It had to do with the drought, which pushed people to the city of different ethnicities, which caused a lot of inter-ethnic strife, and then that, in combination with all the political tensions contributed in a major way to that civil war.

The representatives were then asked who or what their organization would say is at fault for causing climate change and the resulting migration. Most (3) of the organizations said that nation-states and corporations are at fault for causing climate displacement. Specifically, these organization representatives pointed to the outsourcing of labor and production to nations of the Global South, and for government programs such as the Northern American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

One representative said:

I think NAFTA created a lot of problems. It caused food shortages, as well as forced people to leave their homes in Mexico because they couldn't compete with the low prices. You know, governments and big business.

Another representative stated:

Our governments have a huge responsibility in providing the resources and tools to work this out. There needs to be a balance between government and corporations. Look at all these car factories. You know that there needs to be a balance to this. They are making millions of dollars. They are providing jobs to the community, but they destroying the

community's environment. I just see there is no balance to this. The rich get richer, and the

poor get poorer.

One (1) migration organization representative stated that only governments are at fault for the inequalities that shape climate change and the resulting migration. This representative stated:

The political side has a major responsibility. There is a responsibility of governments who

are not doing enough about it. But it's also a matter of building community resilience. It is

very much about inequalities. It's not all communities that are being affected. Certain

communities are being hit the hardest. And certainly, that inequality, or even like even

racial discrimination, is effective and is absolutely crucial when talking about inequalities.

Some (2) of the migration organization representatives stated that they cannot answer this question for their organization. One representative said:

It's not the organization's policy mission. As individuals, I think that we are aware that

both nation-states and corporations are both complicit in making the conditions of climate

change worse. I mean it's a known fact, but it's not really a [organization] thing.

This section explored how migration organization representatives framed the causes of CCID. The next section goes into how migration organization representatives framed the consequences of climate displacement.

Consequences

The representatives were asked about what their migration organization would say are the consequences of climate displacement. Most (4) of the organization representatives pointed toward multiple consequences of climate displacement. Several (3) mentioned the separation of families as a result of climate displacement, including one (1) representative who stated that the

men of the household are typically expected to make the trek across national lines to seek economic opportunities, leaving the women of the household alone to take care of the house, the kids, and other responsibilities. Among these organizations, two (2) also mentioned losing homes, land, and money as a consequence of CCID. One representative stated:

I mean, climate change has not only killed so many people around the world but also displaced and separated families. Parents have had to trust a guide, to trust a smuggler, to bring their tiny little ones across the border alone. Besides being poor and not able to provide for their family, they are losing their homes, their piece of land, that's all they had, due to climate change. And that goes along with the large number of migrations that we see.

These two (2) organization representatives also discussed trauma as a consequence of climate displacement. One representative stated:

The journey that they had to go through to get across the border, it's horrendous. It's horrendous. They might be safer but they are so traumatized for the rest of their life. The consequence of displacement is that there is going to be a total generation of women and men and children so traumatized and not dealing with that trauma because they get here, and all they want to do is survive, survive, survive. But they're not taking the moment to work with that trauma.

One (1) migration organization representative said that violence due to economic insecurity is a consequence of climate displacement. This representative stated:

These challenges also generate violence at some point because somebody will engage in violence to take advantage of others. And the problem with this climate-driven migration is

that the consequences that stem from it are kind of underseen, and therefore, under-

addressed.

One (1) organization representative mentioned deportation as a consequence of climate displacement. This representative stated:

Border Patrol was deporting 150 migrants every single day to a very remote town, where there are no humanitarian resources. There is no hospital, even for the locals. That little town is about 2,500 people in the area. They're locals, but they don't even have public transportation. They do not have hospitals, shelters, or anything. So we found out about this crisis and decided to bring all the support into it, and we were able to get some donations from so many sister organizations as well… private donors, and people in general. they were just so impacted by this horrible situation that was happening in that area to our people. And we started delivering 700 bags of food a week, plus water and clothing and everything. So for about five months, we delivered all those donations in the street, meeting people as soon as they were deported back. And then it came out the idea to open that resource center because there is nothing established in that small town.

One (1) migration organization representative discussed health issues that arise from toxic chemicals in drinking water:

Climate displacement is also a health problem. I deal with a lot of people who have a problem with kidneys, kidney failure, because of the water and the drains.

A couple (2) of organization representatives provided only one consequence for climate displacement. These two (2) organizations stated that a consequence of CCID is the mass movement of people across national lines.

One (1) organization representative stated that CCID provides an opportunity for nation-states to recognize the damage they have done to the environment and minoritized people. This organization representative expressed a hope that if nation-states recognize the harm their actions have done to the environment and local communities, governments would use that opportunity to change their behaviors that are exacerbating climate displacement.

To combat the consequences of climate displacement, the representatives were asked how their migration organization serves people displaced by climate change. All (6) of the migration organization representatives stated that they do not directly serve people displaced by climate change, however, they offer services that indirectly benefit climate refugees. Most (4) of the organization representatives offer humanitarian aid to all migrant people including climate refugees. Humanitarian aid may include food and water drops in migrant corridors, as well as creating or supporting migrant shelters and resource centers. Along with this, many (3) of the migration organization representatives stated that they offer medical assistance to migrant populations. One representative stated:

> *[Organization] has a Medical Brigade, like working with people in the communities, getting them health access, medications, everything. If a person's having a baby, you can't get to the hospital because it's like a 20 kilometers walk away, like you couldn't do it. And so that's a huge thing, paying for medical expenses.*

Many (3) migration organization representatives focused on empowering migrant people to advocate for themselves. Empowering the community may include funding projects that local community members operate, as well as providing tools for migrant people to have agency over whether they leave their community for safer living conditions or stay within their community. One representative stated:

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It is really important to consider empowerment as part of this accompaniment. Empower

people to advocate for themselves, not only for their case, but also for the situation they are

enduring, and that others are experiencing with them.

Some (2) organizations focused on creating and financing community development

projects, such as water treatment and sanitation services, as well as hiring local people to make

items to sell at various venues. The money made from these items is returned to the community.

These organizations seek to build community resilience to reduce the need for migration. One

representative stated:

We have a community of women in San Marcos, Guatemala, who does embroidery work

that we buy from them. We sell them on our website. So with that, they can bring a little bit

of income to their homes, and if the situation is safe for them to stay where they are, we

encourage them to stay. The community has 20 women that meet once a week, every

Wednesday. They make these gorgeous tote bags that they do in embroidery.

Many (3) migration organizations offer pro-bono legal services for migrant people.

However, due to climate refugees not qualifying for asylum laws, there are limited legal options

for those displaced by climate change. One representative stated:

With whatever the case is, we will try to respond in a sensitive and compassionate way to

help people. But there was a time when we would do this thing, and that would maybe get

somebody five years while their case was churned through the system. So we might help

someone who's a climate refugee in that regard. There may not be an ultimately positive

outcome, but then also the other thing is buying time. It's not just a sham, which is

something that people on the right will sometimes accuse this type of strategy of, because

it's also an issue of the political landscape, and we can hope that things are going to get

better. And while maybe right now they have no recourse to legal regularization, or

whatever, they may in two or three years. By opening up these types of cases, we are trying

to bet on the future as well. So I think it's the closest I could come to saying what we would

do strategically to help people who are climate refugees.

One (1) organization provides migrant people access to a social worker to assist with navigating the legal system around migration in the U.S., and to assist with integrating into U.S. culture. This representative stated:

We also offer psychological support. We have a social worker to help them navigate, and

hopefully, integrate into the community if that's what they're hoping to do.

One (1) migration organization assists local communities affected by climate change by creating banks and loans for the local residents to reduce the need for migration due to economic insecurity. This representative stated:

Another big thing that [organization] does is called Kiva loans. It's like micro-loans and

micro-financing that they give to the communities. So, having that to start small businesses

and start the process of developing within the community is really huge. And that definitely

combats migration. And so our mission is to support that, however possible.

One (1) organization offers financial assistance to those who wish to return home rather than continue the journey across the U.S.-Mexico border. This representative stated:

They can have money if they want to go back to their countries because they can no longer

do this journey. So it has been really a place of dignity to bring our people, our community

back.

This section looked at how migration organizations frame the consequences of CCID, as characterized by the representatives I interviewed. The next section delves into how migration organizations seek to address climate displacement.

Solutions

The representatives were asked about what solutions their migration organization offers or supports to end climate displacement. Some (2) organization representatives mentioned raising the voices of climate refugees by inviting ordinary people, news media, and politicians to see the border the way the representatives of migration organizations see it. These organizations believe that politicians who see the reality of the border and borderlands will create better migration and climate policies that protect those displaced by climate change. One representative stated:

> *I really think that policies need to change towards these issues. People need to sit down around the table with people who are on the ground, who sees it. I know that there are people out there with power who are writing all these policies, and who have not been on the ground seeing the devastation that climate displacement and migration cause to people, to humanity. We continue the conversation with the hierarchy, with the people who have the power, and try to figure out what the hell is going on in this world. They need to sit down with simple people like me, that are at the border towns every day, and listen and hear all these stories, and hear the issues that their policies cause.*

Some (2) organization representatives mentioned giving people and communities the resources to decide whether they will leave or stay in a community. These resources could be in the form of community resiliency programs, such as tree planting, community development, sanitation programs, or in the form of loans or grants.

What we aim to do is for these people to have choice, that they are not left with one thing to

do, and they have resources.

One (1) organization representative discussed addressing the root causes of CCID, such

as rising greenhouse gas emissions, as a solution to climate displacement. This representative

stated:

I think that if we facilitate legal migration and address root causes of climate displacement,

and really invest in responsible policies in these countries of origin, then we can really

start looking at long-term solutions for these issues.

One (1) organization representative stated that, although employees of the organization

are aware of climate displacement, the organization has not discussed solutions to CCID.

Upon asking the representatives how their migration organization would respond to the

criminalization of major contributors to climate change as a solution to climate displacement,

several (3) of the organization representatives did not know how their organization would

respond to the criminalization of environmental harm. Some (2) of the organization

representatives stated that they thought that their organization would support policies that would

hold political-economic elites in governments and corporations accountable for their actions, but

did not specify how criminalization would play into holding those responsible for environmental

harm accountable. One (1) organization representative stated that they support holding political-

economic elites accountable for their harmful actions toward the environment, but would not

support criminalization as the means of holding people accountable. This representative said:

Sooner or later, responsibility is gonna catch up with them. But criminalizing in a sense of

criminal code or putting people in prison would not resolve the root issues. There is

certainly an element about holding people criminally responsible when they know that their

actions are causing harm but continue to do it anyway. I do not think my organization

would make a primary contribution to something like that.

This section looked at how migration organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to climate displacement. The next section explores how climate organizations view the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID.

Climate Organizations

Participant Organizations, Representatives, and Mission

Overall, six representatives from climate organizations were interviewed for this study. Of these six, several (3) of the representatives were coordinators of specific programs within the organization, a couple (2) were directors or board members of the organization, and one (1) was a project developer and organizer for the organization.

Upon asking the representatives to describe their organization's work, many (5) had multiple foci in the climate arena. Most (5) of the organization representatives stated that they consider themselves part of at least one social movement. All (6) climate organizations included in my research engage in work on a local level. Local work includes taking local citizens to see the realities of the borderlands, putting pressure on local politicians to advocate for climate justice and migration policies, empowering local people to take action through public demonstrations, educating local people on the adverse effects of climate change, financing environmental projects and groups in local communities, and collaborating with local people to better understand the issues they are facing.

All (6) of the climate organizations also engage in work on the national level. National work includes collaborating with various groups across the U.S. to advocate for policy change in the climate arena, pressuring federal politicians to take action against environmental destruction,

working with national corporations to address their sustainability goals, and engaging in activism regarding federal environmental issues, such as nationwide pipelines.

Some (3) of the climate organizations engage in work on a global level. Global work includes creating campaigns that gained traction internationally, offering advocacy training to people in nations other than the U.S., advocating for policy change in nations of the Global South, and attending international conferences such as Conference of the Parties (COP) 26.

As a result of my interviews with representatives, I discovered that many (4) of the climate organizations focus on pressuring governments and institutions to create change in the climate arena. A few (3) organizations focus on activism to create social change. A couple (2) of the organizations focus on wildlife conservation and biodiversity loss. One (1) organization focuses on how border wall construction and militarization affect the local environment, while another (1) organization mentioned concentrating on educating the public on environmental issues, including climate displacement. One (1) organization focuses on researching climate change issues and one (1) organization focuses on approaching climate justice through an Indigenous belief system. This Indigenous belief system includes decolonizing nation-states of the Global North.

The representatives were then asked whether their climate organization had a mission to address CCID. All (6) of the organization representatives stated that their organization recognizes that climate displacement is interrelated with environmental justice, but no climate organization had a specific mission focused on climate displacement. Of these organizations, most (5) representatives stated that their organization addresses CCID through their work in reducing environmental harm in general. One representative said:

Well, we address climate displacement because we understand it's an intersection. One thing I always say is that we can continue to focus on environmental issues or environmental justice, but it is also social justice. They are all completely interrelated, and there is a huge intersection. One of the reasons why the wall is there in the first place is because of human migration. We really want to address the root cause of these issues. We need to start thinking about what's causing people to migrate in the first place.

Another representative said:

Right now we're focused on the mitigation piece; figuring out how to reduce emissions so that we don't have these problems. Current migration issues are not talked about a lot. However, recognition of migration issues in the future if we don't address this issue is discussed. But again, it is just adaptation. It's not preparation for a migration scenario.

One (1) representative said that their organization does have a focus on climate displacement, although CCID is not mentioned in its mission statement. This organization created presentations about CCID to educate ordinary citizens on climate displacement to inform public opinion on climate change and the resulting migration. This representative stated:

Among my various climate presentations, I do make one on climate refugees and Arizona's future. And that's a big part of how human beings will experience climate change. It's a devastating thing, and a lot of people have this crazy idea that climate change is some future event. We don't specifically say it in our mission statement, but it's one of the many things that we see as being key to climate change.

This section described the climate organizations and representatives interviewed in this study. The next section looks at how representatives from climate organizations frame the causes of climate displacement.

Causes

The representatives were asked what their climate organizations would say were the central causes of climate displacement. All (6) of the climate organization representatives described multiple causes of climate displacement. All (6) of the climate organization representatives pointed to extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, flooding, or drought, as a cause of displacement. All (6) of the organization representatives stated that due to these extreme weather events, people were unable to grow crops, and therefore, unable to provide financial support to their families. One representative said:

A very large percentage of those people are coming because, with the climate change there, their way of living on the land was threatened. They could no longer raise crops because of the changes in the weather. They fled into the cities.

Along with this, one (1) climate organization representative mentioned new plant diseases as a culprit behind low crop yields. This representative stated:

In the mid altitudes, they can't raise their crops because they've got all these new plant diseases that are lowering their yield and lowering their ability to support their families.

Most (5) of the climate organization representatives said that sea level rise was a major cause of displacement, especially in small islands or coastal regions. One representative said:

So we went to New Orleans and we went to visit with other Indigenous people down there, and they took us on a tour of what used to be their land. But it was a boat tour. This whole experience of being an activist is scary, yet it's beautiful all at once. So you have all these emotions like you're seeing all this land that's covered in water and the tour guide said that 10 years ago that was all land. We're boating in all this water, and there are some wild horses on the side. And they say that those wild horses will no longer be able to live in this

area in 10 years because of the rising waters, because of climate change. Seeing the wild

horses out there is beautiful, but hearing what's going to happen, and what is happening, is

just heart-wrenching.

Many (4) organization representatives discussed geopolitical impacts and conflicts as central causes of CCID. These geopolitical impacts and conflicts include wars over remaining resources, severe food shortages, and economic hardship leading to violence such as theft and burglary. Of these, half (2) mentioned the Syrian war as an example of a geopolitical conflict that was caused by climate change. One representative said:

We've been told that [climate change] was a significant issue for what the unrest in Syria

was. That the climate changed so dramatically that basically the crops dried up and the

people that were living in rural areas were forced to move because they could no longer

make a living out of the rural areas. They were forced into the cities, and with the cities

being overloaded and unable to support this huge influx, it's caused a lot of the unraveling

of the country.

A few (3) organization representatives pointed to heat waves as a major cause of climate displacement. Along with this, one (1) organization representative connected heat waves with higher rates of wildfires. This representative stated:

I drove by the mall, and it was at the time of the first year that California was getting hit by

wildfires so hard. And there was a guy out at the mall with a big cardboard sign that said

"I'm out of work, fled the wildfires in California." So we're seeing more and more extremes

as scientists have been predicting for decades, and we're seeing some of that in this

country, too.

One (1) climate organization representative stated that toxic drinking water is a central cause of climate displacement. As governments and corporations work together to build more pipelines across areas of the United States, local drinking water has become contaminated with toxic chemicals. This representative said that state-sanctioned building of pipelines through Indigenous lands was another form of genocide, where governments and corporations were purposefully contaminating water sources used by Indigenous communities with deadly and toxic chemicals. This representative stated:

You could drink the water from the Mississippi River in that area and not get sick. And then Enbridge fracked out toxic drilling fluids into the Mississippi River, and the fish developed blisters and died. You can't even put your foot in that water without getting a rash yourself. And the chaos continues today. I have risked my life and my freedom for the Mississippi River, and it wasn't just for the Mississippi River. There are 20 other rivers and 200 bodies of water being affected, and that's all flowing south. The government is using that as another form of genocide. So there are tribes down there that are going to be losing their land, and once they lose their land, the government is no longer going to consider them a tribe which means they no longer have a say on how Mother Earth is protected and being taken care of. They will no longer have that.

Representatives were then asked who or what their climate organization would say is responsible for causing climate displacement. Most (3) of the representatives stated that every person has a responsibility to lower their carbon footprint and to vote for politicians that promote policies to improve environmental protection. One representative stated:

Every bit of carbon we put in the atmosphere is additive. So blaming the big industrial countries like the United States and China, certainly. They put more greenhouse gases into

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the atmosphere than anybody. But it's a counterproductive discussion, in my opinion. I think everybody at this point has some responsibility, we are so desperate. Every single person in every country, every community, needs to reduce their carbon footprint to zero as quickly as they possibly can.

Another representative said:

We have to recognize that collectively, as a world, we are favoring corporations and what corporations are doing over the safety and health of our families and our people. And we continue to put greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. We continue to make policies that put corporate profits over the health and safety of our people, and we can't do that any longer. We have to get to the point where we say 'enough 'if we are going to put priority on the health and safety of all of our people rather than the corporate profits.

Of these two (2) climate organization representatives, one (1) specifically named the U.S. as the nation most responsible for climate displacement. This representative stated:

The United States has huge accountability for climate displacement because we are the number one greenhouse gas producer in the whole world. So I think it is very important for us to acknowledge all the environmental damage that we are doing and that it is also affecting all other countries on a larger scale. Climate displacement especially affects smaller countries, with fewer resources. The impacts of climate change are amplified in communities with fewer resources. Once we talk about when we talk about the country, it encompasses corporations. If we start going into more details of who is really producing the most greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming in general, then definitely, big corporations have a big role to play in that.

One (1) representative stated that corporations and industries were mainly responsible for causing climate change and the resulting migration, but governments hold responsibility for not acting to prevent climate change. This representative stated:

We would put that responsibility on whoever is largely creating the greenhouse gas emissions that are driving climate change - that's generally corporations and industries, whose decisions affect the carbon intensity of all our lives. At some point, you could say that governments are responsible by virtue of the fact that they haven't done enough to curb the emissions driving climate change.

One (1) climate organization representative stated that the responsibility for climate change and CCID began when European settlers first came to North America. This representative said:

It really stems back to when the European settlers started coming over. Before they came over, you could drink from any lake, river, or stream. And the water was so pure. And then you had the European settlers come over, and they see everything as a commodity. "How can I exploit this? How can I exploit that?" Christopher Columbus didn't even make it to Turtle Island but he committed genocide upon a peaceful tribe. So basically, it stems back to colonization, the European settlers coming over to North America. The system was built around genocide and slavery. The system is working exactly as it was designed, so very few can make ridiculous amounts of money off the suffering of many. These fossil fuel companies knew the damage they were going to cause, and they still did it anyways. We can start with the European settlers and then blame it on the system they put in place, and blame it on the corporations, and the one percent that allowed this to happen, or forced it and beat it into us. The system of government is based on capitalism.

This section explored the causes of CCID discussed by climate organization representatives. The next section delves into the consequences offered by climate organizations.

Consequences

The representatives were asked what their climate organization would say are the consequences of CCID. Most (4) of the organization representatives offered multiple consequences that stem from climate displacement. Several (3) of the organization representatives stated that wildlife and plant loss were consequences of CCID. Of these, one (1) organization representative specifically pointed to the mass movement of people, border patrol operations, and border wall construction as consequences that have led to the destruction of wildlife and plant species, as well as the closing of wildlife migration corridors. This representative stated:

> *There is really an environmental consequence by having massive movements of people. One of the biggest things that we've been fighting for is that these walls, which are intended to stop people, are not stopping people, but are stopping wildlife migration corridors. Wildlife that lives in these areas that have been using these corridors for thousands of years now all of a sudden are not able to cross back and forth through their territory. That leaves a huge environmental impact. We have people crossing through pristine areas of the desert which puts them at risk of dying. We have people like border patrol in the area with helicopters and bright lights, and all of this has an impact on what is really a fragile ecosystem, such as the Sonoran desert. And all of these are around the border. Increasing militarization, increasing or decreasing wildlife habitat, and wasting tons of materials on border wall construction. These border walls take so much energy to build, and it's definitely a contributor.*

Some (2) organization representatives mentioned economic insecurity as a consequence of CCID, including the inability to grow crops due to changes in rainfall patterns. One representative stated:

They were getting hit by changes in rainfall season now. It's forced many of them off the land. Before the farmer themself leaves the land, the farm workers get let go first, because the farmer can't afford to keep them. So the farmers are moving to the cities looking for work, desperate to feed their families. And when they can't find work there, they look beyond. And some of them start heading North and they end up at our border.

This climate organization representative also stated that the changing rainfall patterns have extended the growing season of certain crops in some communities. This representative stated:

If you want to look for a little positive, our growing season has gotten a little bit longer here in Flagstaff, and people have always struggled to get their tomatoes to ripen before the growing season is over. So people are having a little bit more success making their tomatoes ripe. But you know, that's a small thing relative to the exponentially increasing risk of wildfire.

Despite the extended growing season that some communities would experience, this organization also stated that due to diminishing crop yields, farmers would not be able to feed as many animals. This representative stated:

There would be a lowering in the amount of meat consumption and that would increase longevity for humans. But there would also be a decrease in the availability of vegetables and fruits. And that would greatly increase human mortality. Malnourishment is the primary connection between those dots.

Along with this, some (2) climate organization representatives mentioned the increased risk of wildfire, drought, and higher temperatures as consequences of CCID. One representative stated:

Half of the drinking water in the Phoenix Metropolitan area comes from the Verde and Salt Rivers and drought would deplete that and there would not be potable water. And that could happen anywhere on the globe, we are seeing it happen in places, rich and poor. I think that catastrophic wildfires and other impacts on climate are causing damage to people and assets.

This representative also stated that the loss of assets may teach the public that environmental harm is not only destroying the environment and minoritized communities but also human assets. This representative stated:

Let's just say that climate change teaches us that we can't afford to [fix what has been destroyed by environmental disasters*] anymore. And that it's actually better to even relocate people who are on these shorelines, or in these river valleys to higher ground, and cover that cost one time, then to do it two or three times in their lifetime. And that we decide to spend the money differently. Then that could be a good outcome.*

Some (2) climate organization representatives stated that climate displacement wreaks havoc on people's personal lives, and exacerbates issues such as language barriers and disparities in previous job training. These issues may affect a person's ability to integrate into another country's society. One representative stated:

It just wreaks havoc on their own personal lives when they go to other countries. Of course, there are language barriers, but also, their previous training for jobs isn't necessarily able

to transfer to the new country. So often it turns up that a self-sufficient family that earned a decent living in their country is now put into severe poverty.

Some (2) organization representatives stated that health problems are a consequence of climate displacement. Health problems mentioned by the representatives include polluted air, as well as Native people being displaced from their lands, and forced to depend on processed foods rather than their Indigenous foods. One representative said:

When the government built the garrison dam in North Dakota, they built it on tribal land. So they displaced so many indigenous people, and before, this whole tribe was self-sufficient. Before this happened their lives were amazing. They could just walk out their back door and pick berries for breakfast. They didn't have to rely on anyone or anything, and they had everything they needed. They had the medicine they needed in natural medicines. After being displaced, they were given government-processed foods that had fewer nutrients in them. And they then had to rely on the government for jobs, and these jobs didn't pay enough. And so that is a huge thing, I'm even affected by this. With us losing all our culture and our way of life. With all the nutrients from that food being gone, Indigenous children are now being born with periodontal disease, so we already have holes in our teeth before they even pop out of our gums. As a child that happened to me. And it happened to my sister.

Along with this, the representative discussed how climate displacement has been used by the U.S. government as a method of genocide against Indigenous people. This representative stated that by taking Indigenous lands away from Indigenous people, the U.S. government is removing Indigenous peoples 'voices from the political arena.

The representatives of climate organizations were then asked what services they offer for those displaced by climate change based on these consequences. All (6) of the climate organization representatives stated that they do not offer services for climate refugees directly. Of these, one (1) organization representative stated that they do public presentations and demonstrations regarding climate displacement to educate ordinary citizens on the harmful effects of CCID. One (1) organization representative stated that their organization collaborates with groups to support migrant shelters and water and food drops in the desert to prevent migrant deaths. This representative stated that this service indirectly supports climate refugees, as people displaced by climate change benefit from the migrant shelters, as well as the food and water drops.

Several (3) representatives said their climate organization focuses on stopping and reversing climate change as a way to indirectly serve climate refugees. These organizations seek to stop and reverse climate change by providing training to communities to help lower their carbon footprint, push for policy change at the federal level regarding environmental protections, focus on decolonizing the Earth, and raise awareness of climate change and how to reduce individual and collective greenhouse gas emissions. One representative stated:

We are an activist organization that helps to change policy, mainly at the Federal level. But we do get involved in some state issues, especially localized environmental issues and environmental advocacy. We try to educate around incidents that are happening, like the Ohio train issue.

This section discussed how the consequences of CCID were framed by representatives from climate organizations. The next section discusses how representatives of climate organizations framed solutions to CCID.

Solutions

The representatives were asked about what solutions their climate organization offers or supports to combat climate displacement. Most (4) of the climate organization representatives discussed addressing climate change as a solution to CCID. The organizations where they work support addressing the root causes of climate change and promote creating mitigation and adaptation strategies to reduce the need for climate migration. Examples of mitigation and adaptation strategies include creating irrigation systems in local communities to combat drought and introducing new crops into communities that could survive drought. One (1) organization representative mentioned legalizing the use of hemp as the solution to climate change and the resulting displacement:

> *We never needed fossil fuels. Fossil fuels are a big reason for climate change. The cotton farmers, the oil barons, and the wood producers forced us and used us and abused us and beat us, and used racism to make hemp illegal and force us into using fossil fuels. We always had the capability and the technology to use better sources. There are so many useful benefits of hemp. You can build houses out of hemp. Make clothes out of hemp. You can fuel your houses out of hemp. You can fuel your cars out of hemp. Even the navy uses rope made out of hemp. The topsoil in the United States has depleted drastically, and hemp helps put nutrients back into the soil. Hemp helps refresh the depleted soil and restore stability and nutrients. Hemp can also clean the air. It's an excellent carbon sequestration. One hectare of industrial hemp can absorb 15 tons of carbon dioxide per hectare. Hemp's rapid growth makes it one of the fastest carbon dioxide to biomass conversion tools available.*

According to representatives, some (2) of the climate organizations seek to address CCID by advocating for policy change at the local, national, and federal levels. These organizations advocate for immigration reform, reducing border wall construction, and increasing economic development in local communities. Along with this, some (2) organization representatives mentioned the importance of elevating the voices of migrant people. Of these, one (1) discussed elevating the voices of migrant people by inviting ordinary people, the news media, and politicians to the border to witness the reality that people crossing and living in the borderlands experience. This representative stated:

> We realize that most of the decisions regarding the borderlands, that have a direct
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> consequence for the people of the borderlands, are not taken by Borderlands communities.
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> They're taken by politicians from far away, that don't really understand the dynamics of the
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> border. So we want to elevate voices and think about who's missing from the conversation.

I asked the representatives how their climate organization would respond to the criminalization of actors in governments and corporations whose actions are causing environmental harm. Some (2) organization representatives stated that they thought their organization would support policies that seek to criminalize those who knowingly cause widespread environmental harm. One (1) organization representative stated that they believe their organization would support holding political-economic elites accountable for their harmful actions or inactions using Indigenous beliefs. One representative stated:

> With [organization] being an Indigenous-led organization, the way we view criminalization
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> is different than the way the Government views criminalization. They need to be held
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> accountable. They need to be stripped of all that wealth and all of that needs to go toward
>
> fixing what they did. We have been criminalized ourselves for wanting clean water, for

wanting to be what we are capable of being. [Organization] wants criminalization, but not

in the U.S. government way, but in the Indigenous way. It's not like locking you up and

torturing you. It's more like taking away everything, but you still live a life.

Some (2) climate organization representatives stated that it would be unlikely that their

organization would seek out criminalization policies to support. One (1) organization stated that

every person has some responsibility for climate change, therefore, it would be unrealistic to

criminalize everyone. This representative stated:

We all have a role in environmental harm. You can't arrest everything. We are all driving

fossil-fuel cars. Most of us are using fossil fuels to heat our homes. All of us are consuming

the products that are brought to our city by fossil fuels. So you can't criminalize at that

level.

This section looked at the solutions to CCID mentioned by representatives of migration

organizations. In the next section, I compare the framings used by migration organizations and

climate organizations based on my interviews with representatives and connect what I learned

from my interviews to the criminological literature on climate change and mobility.

Comparing Frames Used by Climate Organizations and Migration Organizations

Based on responses from the representatives I interviewed, I discovered multiple areas of

overlap and difference in the way migration organizations and climate organizations frame the

causes, consequences, and solutions to climate displacement. I begin this section by describing

the similarities in how the organizations frame the causes of climate displacement. Then, I

compare the consequences of climate displacement that were offered by the organizations.

Finally, I compare how organization representatives framed the solutions to CCID.

Causes

There were multiple points of overlap and differences in how migration organizations and climate organizations framed the causes of CCID, according to the representatives I interviewed. All (12) of the organization representatives stated that they recognize that climate displacement is interrelated with both environmental justice and migration policy; however, CCID is not explicitly included in any of the organization's mission statements. Most (11) representatives said their organization identified economic insecurity due to extreme weather events as a top cause of CCID. Many (4) of the migration organization representatives also pointed toward general violence as a cause of economic insecurity. These representatives stated that extreme weather conditions may lead to violence due to economic hardship from not being able to grow and sell crops.

Many (6) organization representatives mentioned geopolitical impacts and conflicts as central causes of climate displacement, with the majority (4) being from climate organizations. Some (3) organization representatives mentioned the Syrian War as an example of a geopolitical conflict that led to an influx of people displaced by climate change. Along with this, some (3) organization representatives pointed to specific actions of nation-states and large corporations as a cause of CCID. Particularly, the inequalities associated with the outsourcing of labor and production to the Global South by large corporations and nation-states as well as state-sanctioned dumping of toxic materials into local communities were noted by the representatives.

Overall, eight organization representatives framed CCID as being caused by nation-states and/or corporations. Of these, five said that CCID was both the nation-states' and corporations' fault. On the other hand, one (1) organization framed the cause of CCID as mainly nation-states, one (1) organization representative placed the blame mainly on corporations, and one (1)

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representative placed the blame on the European settlers who first colonized the Americas and put in place a system of governance aimed at benefitting political-economic elites.

Causes of CCID from Climate and Migration Organizations

Responses	Climate Organizations	Migration Organizations
Climate changes (extreme weather)	X	X
Economic insecurity	X	X
Outsourcing of Labor and Production		X
Sea Level Rise	X	X
New Plant Diseases	X	
Geopolitical Impacts and Conflicts	X	X

Consequences

Along with this, there were several points of overlap and difference between how the climate and migration organization representatives framed the consequences of CCID. Half (3) of the migration organization representatives focused on the harm and trauma people experienced due to climate displacement, including the separation of families, deportation, and the trauma caused by the journey across the border. In contrast, half (3) of the climate organization representatives focused on the damage to wildlife and ecosystems as a result of CCID. Representatives of both types of organizations mentioned economic insecurity as a consequence of climate displacement, with the migration organization representatives discussing general violence related to economic insecurity. Representatives of both types of organizations also mentioned health problems as a consequence of CCID. Health problems included polluted air, toxic drinking water, and malnourishment due to not being able to grow crops.

According to those interviewed, none of the organizations in my research project directly served people displaced by climate change, although all (12) of the organization representatives said their organization recognizes displacement as a result of climate change. However, almost all (6 migration; 5 climate) of the organizations do offer services that indirectly benefit climate refugees. Overall, the migration organizations offer a total of eight services that indirectly benefit those displaced by climate change. These services are focused mainly on humanitarian aid, medical assistance, community development, legal assistance, and providing financial assistance to those displaced individuals who wish to return home. The climate organizations offer a total of three services that indirectly serve climate refugees. The climate organizations mainly focused on stopping and reversing climate change as a way to indirectly serve climate refugees. These services include providing training for local communities to lower their carbon footprint in the hopes to reduce the need for migration, pushing for environmental policy change on the federal level, focusing on decolonization, and raising awareness of climate change through education and activism.

Consequences of CCID from Climate and Migration Organizations

Responses	Climate Organizations	Migration Organizations
Deportation		X
Health Problems and Mortality	X	X
Losing Homes, Land, and Money	X	X
Trauma		X
Violence		X
Mass movement of people		X
Separated Families		X

Environmental Impact of Border Patrol/Walls	X	
Increasing Risk of Wildfire	X	
Loss of Biodiversity and Wildlife	X	
Economic Insecurity	X	X

Solutions

Based on my interviews with representatives, there were several areas of overlap and difference between how the migration organizations framed efforts to combat CCID compared to climate organizations. Most (4) of the climate organizations focus on addressing climate change as the main solution to ending climate displacement, while only one (1) migration organization focused on addressing climate change as a solution to CCID. Along with this, some (3) climate organizations and migration organization representatives mentioned the importance of reducing the need for migration by assisting communities to build resilience through development projects.

Both the climate organizations and migration organization representatives mentioned the importance of elevating migrant voices as a solution to CCID. Some (2 migration; 1 climate) of the representatives discussed inviting ordinary people, politicians, and the news media to witness the realities of the border and borderlands to elevate migrant voices. I call this concept "borderland tourism," which involves inviting outsiders to the border and borderlands to witness the harm that is taking place against people and the environment due to border wall construction, border patrol, and border policies. The concept of borderland tourism is similar to Pezzulo's concept of "toxic tourism" (Pezzulo, 2009). Toxic tourism refers to when local people invite outsiders to their towns that have been devastated by climate change and anthropogenic action. The goal of toxic tourism is to show how environmental harm affects people and their

communities in the hopes that those witnessing the harm will be motivated to take political action against environmental destruction. Some (3) of the representatives interviewed already offer tours of the border and borderlands intending to highlight migrant voices and allow migrant people to advocate for themselves when tour groups come to the borderlands.

Further, half (3 migration; 3 climate) of the organization representatives discussed holding political-economic elites accountable for their role in causing widespread environmental harm. All (6) of these organization representatives stated that their organization would support policies that aim to hold political-economic elites accountable for their role in environmental destruction, but the representatives were unsure of how supportive their organization would be of criminalization given that it often creates other harmful consequences. One (1) climate organization representative discussed holding those elites responsible for widespread environmental harm accountable through an Indigenous belief practice. This representative stated that their organization would not support locking a person up in prison, but would support taking a person's wealth away and giving it to programs or people harmed as a way to hold elites accountable for their actions.

Solutions to CCID from Climate and Migration Organizations

Responses	Climate Organizations	Migration Organizations
Make Climate Refugee a Protected UN Category		X
Push for Policy Change	X	
Address Climate Change	X	X
Community Development	X	X
Place Resources in Communities		X
Elevate Migrant Voices	X	X

Connecting to the Literature

In this section, I analyze what I learned about how climate organizations and migration organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID by drawing on the criminological literature on migration and climate change.

Lack of Focus on CCID

All (12) of the organization representatives I interviewed mentioned that climate displacement is a serious issue, but representatives noted that none of the organizations had a specific mission to combat CCID. This finding is consistent with my discovery that CCID is underexamined in both the migration and climate change literature within criminology. While looking through some of the criminological literature on migration, it was clear that CCID was not addressed within much of the scholarly work on mobility. Much of the literature discusses the migrant population as a whole and does not focus explicitly on climate refugees (Chomsky, 2014; Mountz et al., 2013; Wonders and Jones, 2019). Similarly, climate displacement is mentioned by some green criminologists (Brisman, 2019; Brisman, South, & White, 2015; Lynch, Fegadel, & Long, 2021), though it has not been a central focus of attention with this subfield, and CCID is largely ignored in mainstream criminological literature

The lack of focus on CCID within the organizations in my research project, and in the criminological literature I examined, reveals an important and concerning shortcoming in both social action and criminological research. As stated by an organization representative:

> *Climate change is a major driver in forcing people to leave their homes. It is forcing*
>
> *people to leave rural areas of Latin American countries and go to cities that are pressure*
>
> *cookers in areas that are very difficult for them to survive economically, socially, and*
>
> *security-wise. This causes people to make the decision to leave their homes and cross the*

border. We're aware that climate is a driver in this whole human displacement, but it

doesn't become part of our work.

The representatives in this study recognized climate displacement as an important issue

that people, especially in the Global South, are facing today. However, none of the organizations

in the study have a particular focus or mission regarding climate displacement. While

researching organizations for this study, I have not found any social movements or organizations

specifically dedicated to addressing CCID. The lack of focus on climate displacement within the

social justice arena and in the literature is alarming and highlights the critical importance of my

current research focus.

The Problem of "Crisis" Frames

There has been increased attention within the criminological literature to the ways that

nation-states use the "climate crisis" as justification for building stronger border walls and

implementing stricter border patrol methods (White, 2014; Wonders and Jones, 2021). Current

literature on framing discusses how crisis narratives or emergency frames are often used to instill

a sense of fear or urgency about an issue (Narang, 2017; Penny, 2007). Half (4 migration; 2

climate) organization representatives used the word "crisis" or "emergency" while describing

climate change and the resulting displacement. The use of "crisis" or "emergency" frames by half

(6) of the representatives leads me to believe that many organizations are using a crisis narrative

to describe climate change and the resulting migration. Crisis frames do little to address

underlying causes of harm and instead tend to give nation-states justification to use climate

change as a reason to continue fortifying national borders in the name of security and in

anticipation of future climate wars.

Responsibility for CCID

Eight (4 migration; 4 climate) organization representatives framed nation-states and/or corporations as being mainly responsible for climate change and the resulting displacement. Green criminological literature also often points to nation-states and corporations as responsible for climate displacement (Brisman, South, & Walters, 2018; Kramer, 2020; Kramer & Michalowski, 2012). Criminologists frame the harm that is caused by nation-states and corporations working together toward a common goal as state-corporate crime (Kramer & Michalowski, 2012). Kramer and Michalowski (2012) argue that state-corporate crime happens when nation-states and corporations fail to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, or when nation-states fail to create adequate climate adaptation or mitigation policies. They also emphasize that when nation-states and corporations fail to act on an issue that is causing widespread social and physical injury, a state-corporate crime of omission has occurred (Kramer & Michalowski, 2012).

Similarly, organization representatives discussed how nation-states are failing to provide needed protections for people affected by climate displacement. Organization representatives pointed to state-sanctioned toxic dumping and geopolitical conflicts leading to resource shortages and economic hardships, as well as environmental issues resulting from the outsourcing of labor and production to countries of the Global South as direct results of actions or inactions by nation-states to mitigate climate change. The failure of nation-states to act on climate change by mitigating governmental and corporate environmental harm makes the resulting displacement a state-corporate crime of omission.

Environmental harm resulting from the outsourcing of labor and production to the Global South has been framed as a state-corporate crime (Michalowski & Kramer, 2006; Kramer 2020).

Three (migration) organization representatives framed the outsourcing of labor and production to the Global South as an example of nation-states and corporations working together toward a shared vision that is resulting in substantial harm. Some criminologists argue that nation-states and corporations seek to maintain the current social hierarchy through exploitation and capitalism (Michalowski & Kramer, 2006). Political-economic elites are able to stay on top of the hierarchy by moving labor and production of goods to nations of the Global South (Brisman, South, & Walters, 2018). Political-economic elites are able to exploit that nation's people and resources to maximize profits for themselves.

Nation states and corporations may commit a state-corporate crime through omission or commission (Michalowski & Kramer, 2006). Many (4 migration; 4 climate) organization representatives stated that nation-states and corporations are causing harm by not creating legislation or business practices designed to mitigate climate change. The desire of organizations to hold nation-states and corporations accountable for their role in widespread environmental harm shows that many organizations view climate change and the resulting migration as an issue that is exacerbated by the powerful in society (Kramer & Michalowski, 2012).

Similarly, six (1 migration; 5 climate) organizations framed geopolitical conflicts as a cause of displacement. Specifically, three organizations discussed the Syrian War as a geopolitical conflict that caused climate displacement. The connection between climate change and geopolitical conflict has been established in green criminological literature (Brisman, 2013; White, 2014). As stated by White (2014), increased resource use is related to the increased construction of physical and social borders due to fear of geopolitical conflicts for remaining resources.

Bordering, "Othering", and Migrant Voices

I also observed another point of comparison between how the migration organizations viewed the harm caused by CCID and the criminological literature on mobility. Three (migration) organizations discussed the trauma that is caused by climate displacement, including trauma due to bordering and deportation. Bordering and detention practices are used to label people as favored or disfavored within a nation-state (Franko Aas & Gundhus, 2015; Wonders & Jones, 2019, 2021). Those people who successfully cross the border into a nation-state are villainized as the "other," and subjected to increased surveillance that can lead to deportation (Franko, 2020; Milivojevic & Radulski, 2020; Welch & Shuster, 2005). As McDowell and Wonders (2009) note, these border patrol methods are used to locate, detain, and deport people labeled "illegal." Being labeled as "other" or "illegal" may cause long-term trauma to those displaced by climate change.

Along with this, one climate organization mentioned bordering as a consequence of CCID. Bordering has caused environmental damage due to border wall construction and border patrol practices. Criminological research on climate change does not often address the ecological impacts of border wall construction, but White (2014) mentions how the construction of border walls makes it more difficult for people displaced by climate change to seek safety from environmental disasters.

Another point of comparison between the organizations 'responses and the literature is the emphasis on elevating migrant voices as a way to combat bordering and "othering." Many (2 migration; 2 climate) organization representatives stated that their organization emphasizes empowering migrant people to advocate for themselves in the political and social arenas. Empowering those affected by climate displacement to advocate for themselves has been brought

up in criminological literature on migration (Piven, 2008; Wonders & Jones, 2019). Scholars have emphasized that migrant people can challenge physical and social borders by reconstructing themselves as worthy of human rights, which can lead to widespread normative and cultural acceptance of border crossing (Aas, 2007; Wonders & Jones, 2019, 2021).

Change from Below

Some (2 migration; 1 climate) mentioned inviting ordinary citizens, the news media, and politicians to visit the borderlands to witness the effects bordering has on people and the environment. I am calling this concept borderland tourism, which relates to "change from below" solutions discussed in the criminological literature on migration (Wonders, 2017; Wonders, 2018; Wonders & Jones, 2019, 2021). As stated in Wonders (2017, p. 18), change from below occurs "at the subnational level, from ordinary people, including both citizens and border crossers." Giving migrant people the platform to show the public what is happening to their land and lives through tours of the borderlands gives migrant people the agency and opportunity to advocate for themselves in the social and political arenas, which they have been expelled from due to their citizenship status (Sassen, 2016).

This section compared how migration organizations and climate organizations frame CCID and analyzed some of the research findings I obtained through my interviews by making connections to the framings found within the criminological literature on climate change and mobility. Next, in the final chapter, I discuss the broader implications of my research around CCID, particularly for public criminology and for creating social change in the climate displacement arena.

<center>**V. Conclusion**</center>

In this chapter, I discuss my key research findings, areas for future research, and strengths and weaknesses of my research project. I also discuss the implications of my research for social change, including the importance of public criminology, the value of eliminating the use of crisis frames within organizations and relying upon alternative frames about CCID, and the need to elevate migrant voices so that they can help to inform our understanding of the causes, consequences and solutions to CCID.

Climate-Induced Displacement and Criminology

As this thesis has emphasized, climate change is the leading cause of forced displacement all over the world and is especially prevalent in non-industrialized nations (Atapattu, 2020; Miller, 2017, 2021). Some criminological literature recognizes that climate change exacerbates issues of borders and border security but, as I have discussed, some criminological literature utilizes frames about the causes and consequences of CCID that give nation-states further justification to build higher and stronger border walls (White, 2014; Wonders & Jones, 2021). Much of the criminological literature on migration does not specifically focus on those displaced by climate change, but instead focuses on migrant populations as a whole (Milivojevic & Radulski, 2020).

As I examined in Chapter 2, the criminological literature on both climate change and migration share a common focus on nation-states and corporations 'role in climate change, the criminalization of migrant bodies, geopolitical conflict arising from bordering issues, the social exclusion of migrant people, and the increasing militarization and surveillance at national borders (Sassen, 2016; White, 2014; McDowell & Wonders, 2009). While reviewing the literature, I found that when climate change is viewed as a crisis, border fortification and

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securitization increase (White, 2014), while motivation to tackle the underlying causes of climate change decreases (Narang, 2017). This discovery led me to develop a research project aimed at examining how CCID is framed.

Answering the Research Questions

My review of the literature informed the research questions utilized in this study. The research questions include:

1. How do those who work in climate organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID?

2. How do those who work in migration organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID?

3. What similarities and differences are revealed when the framings provided by those representing different kinds of organizations are compared?

I interviewed representatives from climate organizations and migration organizations to deepen my understanding of how different kinds of organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID. While conducting this study, I learned several important points from the representatives of climate organizations and migration organizations.

While collecting data, I found that *none* of the organizations specifically focused on CCID; in other words, they do not frame climate displacement as central to their organizations' mission. The lack of attention to climate displacement by these organizations reveals a striking gap given how important organizations are for facilitating social movement action around important social problems (Gamson, 1975).

Next, I learned that most (8) organization representatives placed responsibility for the causes of climate change and displacement on the actions or inaction of nation-states and

corporations. Given my reading of the criminological literature, I interpret what these organization representatives said as a "state-corporate crime" framing of CCID (Kramer, 2020; Michalowski & Kramer, 2006). Although these eight organizations hold nation-states and corporations mainly responsible for climate change and the resulting displacement, only one of the organizations has a particular mission to confront political-economic elites. Further, none of the organizations sought to criminalize political-economic elites, however, many (6) of them stated that they would like nation-states and corporations to be held accountable for their actions or inaction that exacerbate climate change and displacement.

Similarly, I learned that half (6) of the organizations frame the consequences of climate displacement as related to geopolitical conflicts (White, 2014). Some (3) of these organizations mentioned the Syrian War as a geopolitical conflict caused by climate change, which led to the displacement of the Syrian population. Although half (6) of the organizations mentioned geopolitical conflicts as a cause and/or consequence of CCID, none of the organizations have a specific focus on geopolitical conflicts and issues that arise from climate change.

Finally, I learned that some (3) of the organizations frame the solutions to climate displacement using a "change from below" approach (Wonders, 2017; Wonders & Jones, 2019, 2021). These organizations emphasize the importance of elevating migrant voices and experiences. One way to do this is through borderland tourism. Borderland tourism would allow people living and working in the borderlands to share their stories with ordinary people, politicians, and news media to push for change in public opinion and policy surrounding migration and climate change. Similar to this, some (3) organizations emphasize the need to create resilient communities as an adaptation strategy to climate change. In both the borderland

tourism and community resilience strategies, people from the borderlands would be able to advocate for themselves and regain agency over their communities.

Learning how migration organizations and climate organizations frame climate displacement is essential for understanding how to motivate people to take action against climate displacement (Gamson, 1975, 1992). As an activist, I have heard many people state that climate change is a crisis, and there is nothing we can do about it. If organizations are promoting climate change and displacement as a crisis, people may be less likely to participate in the social movement for change. How a social issue is framed influences the amount of support a social movement receives (Gamson, 1992). As stated in Gamson (1992), social movements rely on collective action frames to motivate people to act on a social issue. Rather than focusing on crisis, such themes as injustice, identity, and agency must be discussed within organizations to ensure social issues are being framed in a way that highlights the issue at hand, creates solidarity for or against an issue, and convinces participants that their involvement in the movement can change the injustice (Gamson, 1992). The crisis frame often promotes the idea that an issue is insurmountable and not able to be fixed; in addition, it tends to benefit the interests of national security organizations by framing issues as threat multipliers (Narang, 2017). Because participants in a movement must be convinced that their involvement could influence the injustice, the crisis framing of CCID by organizations is likely to reduce participation in the movement by making it seem as if climate displacement is impossible to tackle.

In this section, I outlined my motivation to study how organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to climate displacement and described how my review of the literature informed my research questions. I also highlighted some of my key findings. In the

next section, I highlight suggestions for social change that I discovered through my interviews with people who work in migration organizations and those who work in climate organizations.

Implications for Social Change

Although climate displacement was recognized as a widespread issue by all (12) of the representatives I interviewed, none of the organizations had a specific mission to combat CCID. The first implication for social change is for organizations to add a focus on CCID to their mission statements. Based on my research, there does not seem to be a specific social movement or organization that focuses primarily on the crucially important issue of climate displacement. I believe that the first step in reducing climate displacement would be for organizations to have a greater focus on CCID and perhaps for a new organization to be created that focuses exclusively on this issue. The organization representatives in this study said that they serve those displaced by climate change only indirectly. Organizations must center CCID within their focus in both the migration and climate arenas to develop solutions aimed at serving those displaced by climate change and reducing the number of people displaced by climate change every year through prevention efforts and a focus on structural change.

The second implication for social change I suggest is reframing CCID within organizations as a structural issue that needs structural solutions. How social issues are framed influences the amount of support a movement receives (Gamson, 1992). After conducting interviews with representatives from climate organizations and migration organizations, as well as reviewing social science literature on migration and climate change, it became apparent that many organizations frame climate displacement as a crisis (Narang, 2017; Teso et al., 2021). At the same time, the framing of CCID as caused by state-corporate crime and geopolitical conflict reveals that some migration organizations and climate organizations consider climate

displacement to be a structural issue requiring structural solutions. It is my view that this is a valuable alternate framing for organizations if the goal is to engage a broad public in social change efforts.

To begin reframing CCID as a structural issue rather than a crisis, public criminology must be utilized to create social change through research. Criminologists must seek out non-academic spaces to start a discussion about CCID as a structural issue that needs to be met with structural solutions. Non-academic spaces may include activities such as writing books, giving speeches, engaging with news media sources as an expert on climate displacement, or taking an active role in a social movement or with community organizing. While working on my thesis, I went to several community meetings regarding climate change and discussed the implications of using crisis narratives. The meetings were comprised mostly of those who work in climate organizations, professors in environmental science, and undergraduate students in environmental studies. I plan to continue my discussions with organizations in both the climate and migration arenas to discuss the effects that the crisis framing of climate change and displacement have on people and the environment.

Although I did not speak to the organization representatives about public criminology, many of the structural solutions the representatives offered can benefit from engagement with public criminology. Based on responses from organization representatives, addressing CCID on the structural level may include using criminological research to address the root causes of climate displacement, create stronger legal protections for people displaced by climate change, develop better environmental protections to reverse climate change and end the resulting displacement, advocate for a system change rather than policy change (see Kramer, 2020), and hold political-economic elites accountable for their role in climate displacement.

Addressing the root causes of CCID would involve not only addressing the consequences of climate change and the resulting inequalities but also reversing it through prevention efforts (Lynch et al., 2017; Parenti, 2011, 2014). International policy that drastically reduces greenhouse gas emissions is necessary to decrease the need to migrate due to environmental degradation. Further, communities affected by climate change must be given resources to initiate community development and resilience projects. As mentioned by organization representatives in this study, people must be allowed the agency to decide whether to stay in their community or leave due to environmental harm. Communities with fewer resources and technologies are unable to adapt to changes in the environment, which often results in the displacement of people from their homes (Dijoudi et al., 2016; White, 2014). As one representative stated: *what we aim to do is for these people to have choice, that they are not left with one thing to do, and they have resources.*

Inequalities between and within countries impact climate-induced displacement due to a lack of resources and technologies (Dijoudi et al., 2016). The structural inequalities that disadvantage countries in the Global South must be addressed if we are to effectively address climate displacement in the Global South (Dijoudi et al., 2016). One way to address the inequalities that lead to climate-induced displacement in the Global South is to hold nation-states and corporations in the Global North accountable for their historic role in climate change. Nation-states and corporations would need to be held accountable by a non-governmental, specialized court to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels, as well as implement sustainable business practices that do not exploit those in the Global South.

The latter suggestion brings me to the third implication for social change I suggest, which includes holding nation-states and corporations accountable for actions – and inaction - that contribute to climate change and displacement. Based on the organization representatives'

responses, I found that organizations in both the migration and climate fields view climate

change largely as a result of the relationship between nation-states and organizations. Overall,

eight (8) organizations pointed to nation-states and/or corporations as responsible for climate

displacement. Six organizations stated that they would support policies that hold political-

economic elites accountable for their environmentally harmful actions, but none of the

organizations explicitly said they would support a criminalization policy. These organizations

discussed holding political-economic elites accountable by taking the wealth they earned from

environmentally harmful behaviors and investing that money into community development and

resilience projects to reduce the need for climate migration. On a structural level, special courts

must be created to handle cases involving widespread environmental harm caused by nation-

states and corporations. These courts would be responsible for facilitating interaction between

people or communities that have been affected by climate change, and the entities that are largely

responsible for it. This idea relates to the concept of Indigenous peacekeeping, but on a structural

rather than local level (see Nielsen & Gould, 2003).

Related to this, the fourth implication for social change that emerges from this study is

the need to elevate migrant voices so that the perspectives and experiences of those displaced by

climate change can become more central to debates about causes, consequences, and especially

solutions to CCID. One promising way to do this is through borderland tourism. Borderland

tourism entails local communities inviting ordinary people, politicians, and news media to the

borderlands to witness the realities of border walls, border patrol, and the environmental harm

that is plaguing their communities. Borderland tourism aims to change public opinion about the

borderlands and the effects of climate change and displacement in the Global South by giving

tours of the border, the surrounding towns, and areas facing climate devastation. People living

and working in the borderlands tell their stories to a large variety of people and audiences. By sharing their stories, migrant people are able to advocate for change on a global scale and to reframe understandings of the harm caused by CCID.

In this section, I discussed implications for social change based on the data I collected through interviews with representatives of migration organizations and climate organizations. In the next section, I suggest needed areas of future research related to CCID.

Future Research

Future research in this area should focus on how multi-scalar realities influence how organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions of CCID. In my study, I interviewed representatives of organizations that work at various scales – international, national, and local. Recent scholarship has highlighted the importance of multi-scalar thinking for understanding complex social challenges (Wonders, 2018). Although questions of scale were ultimately beyond the scope of my project, my interviews revealed some differences in how representatives view climate displacement, depending on their scale of operation. For example, organizations that were focused globally used the word "crisis" to describe climate change and the resulting displacement more often than organizations at the local or national level. Future research should explore these differences more closely to look for overlaps and differences in how organizations that operate at various scales view climate displacement. This topic is important as organizations at the local, national, and global levels have different foci when it comes to social action and change. Based on my interviews, it appears that organizations on the local level are concerned with community-based issues, while organizations at the national and federal levels are more concerned with policy or system changes. If crisis frames are to be eliminated from use in

organizations, it is important to explore why organizations at various scales use the crisis frame more or less frequently.

Considering questions of scale is especially important for understanding which solutions are likely to have the most impact. Future research targeting the global or international scale of action should consider the value of human rights framings for helping to globalize concern about CCID. As climate refugees do not qualify for the status of refugees under the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, those displaced by climate change cannot seek legal protection or asylum (Fornalé & Doebbler, 2017). As a result, many people are excluded from protection by legal systems. One (1) representative spoke in depth about the legal limitations of assisting those displaced by climate change. This representative stated:

> *As you probably know, there is no legal definition for a climate refugee. It ties into all of the economic social security issues, but there's no legal definition. It can't help somebody, as far as I know, in an asylum claim. So what we do is we provide support to people, both emotional support, logistical support, and legal support to the level that we can.*

Focusing on human rights framing is one way to create pressure at the national level to incorporate CCID into national laws and legal protections.

This section detailed some possible areas of future research focused on CCID. The next section delves into the strengths and weaknesses of this study.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Throughout this project, I have valued the opportunity to talk with people at the forefront of the climate and migration social justice arenas. However, I faced challenges when trying to get organizations to respond to my requests for an interview. Many organizations rejected my

request for an interview due to their limited time and resources. If I were to do this project again, I would think about using a survey that representatives of organizations could take online in addition to conducting interviews. While surveys do not provide the depth of understanding that interviewing allowed me to have, I may have been able to collect some kinds of information from more organizations. Along with this, I would consider offering a financial incentive to encourage participation in the study. As many organizations rejected my request for an interview due to scarce resources, offering some kind of compensation may have led to increased participation.

A strength of this study was that I was able to interview a variety of organizations with different foci in the migration and climate fields. Although my study is not generalizable to all migration organizations or climate organizations, I gained in-depth and rich information from the representatives who spoke with me. As stated by deMarrais and Lapan (2003, p. 52), qualitative interviews allow the interviewer to "discover that person's view of an experience or phenomenon of study." The goal of my study was not to reach generalizability but to gain a deeper understanding of how migration organizations and climate organizations view the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID. I am confident that interviewing was the best way to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how people working in migration organizations and climate organizations frame the causes, consequences, and solutions of CCID.

Closing Remarks

As global temperatures rise, people from all over the world are being displaced by environmental disasters (Lynch et al., 2017; Parenti, 2011). Some criminologists have begun to research the complex connections between climate change, migration, and CCID, but there has been little scholarly work examining how organizations at the forefront of climate justice and

migration justice view and respond to CCID. Yet, as my research has highlighted, such organizations are well positioned to have important impacts on public debates about the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID.

Moving forward, criminologists, organizations, and social movements should emphasize combatting climate displacement. Greater communication and collaboration are needed between climate justice and migration scholars – and organizations - about how to frame the causes, consequences, and solutions to CCID in ways that motivate people to take action and engage in social change. Organizations must eliminate the use of crisis frames as crisis narratives reduce participation in social movements and tend to give nation-states justification to build stronger physical and social borders. It is my view that public criminology has an important role to play in offering alternative framings about the causes and consequences of CCID, as well as solutions such as policy creation, system and structural change, and specialized courts for exploring widespread environmental harms. Public criminologists must continue to learn from those working on the ground in organizations, as I have prioritized in my research, and should also continue to elevate migrant voices by encouraging people displaced by climate change to share their stories and experiences with people in the political and social arenas. Listening to the voices of those most affected by climate change is essential for addressing climate change-induced displacement and creating lasting change.

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List of Possible Organizations

Migration Organizations
Local

●   **Salvavision** - https://salvavision.org/
●   Mi Jente - https://mijente.net/
●   The Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project - https://firrp.org/
●   **Tucson Samaritans - http://www.tucsonsamaritans.org/**
●   No Más Muertes - https://nomoredeaths.org/es/
●   Yuma Border - N/A
●   Empower AZ - https://www.empoweraz.org/
●   Puente AZ - https://www.empoweraz.org/
●   ACLU AZ - https://www.empoweraz.org/
●   **Kino Border Initiative** - https://www.kinoborderinitiative.org/
●   Catholic Charities of Arizona - https://www.catholiccharitiesaz.org/all-locations/immigration
●   Chicanas por la Causa - https://www.cplc.org/
●   Friendly House Family Immigration Services - http://www.friendlyhouse.org/immigration
●   ASU Assistance with Visas for Intl Students - https://students.asu.edu/international/support
●   Refugee and Immigration Services - http://www.lss-sw.org/refugeeservices
●   https://law.arizona.edu/immigration-law-clinic
●   Consulado General de Mexico en Phoenix - https://consulmex.sre.gob.mx/phoenix/
●   American Beginnings: Immigration and Naturalization Services.
●   Rescue - https://www.rescue.org/united-states/phoenix-az
●   ADAC - www.theadac.org
●   **Northern Arizona Immigration Legal Services** - https://immigration-naz.org/
●   Mi Familia Vota Arizona - http://www.mifamiliavota.org/Arizona
●   Homeland Security - https://www.dhs.gov/compliance-branch
●   Arizona Center for Empowerment - https://www.empoweraz.org/

National

●   Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse - https://trac.syr.edu/
●   US ACLU - https://www.aclu.org/immigrants/index.html
●   Immigration Advocates Network - https://www.immigrationadvocates.org/
●   National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights - https://nnirr.org/
●   Four Freedoms Fund - https://neophilanthropy.org/collaborative-funds/four-freedoms-

fund/#:~:text=Four%20Freedoms%20Fund%20(FFF)%20strengthens,life%2C%20community%2C%20and%20future.

- Migration Policy Institute - https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
- National Immigration Forum - https://immigrationforum.org/
- National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild - https://nipnlg.org/
- US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants - https://refugees.org/

Global

- International Organization for Migration - https://www.iom.int/
- Global Migration Group - https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/global-migration-group.html
- UN Migration - https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/migration
- **Open Society Foundations International Migration Initiative** - https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/who-we-are/programs/international-migration-initiative
- US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants - https://refugees.org/
- Migration Data Portal - https://www.migrationdataportal.org/
- International Catholic Migration Commission - https://connect.icmc.net/international-migration/?gclid=Cj0KCQjw1bqZBhDXARIsANTjCPLJOTks8FbbBC7Sc3EQ-uRp8vY5MOLAUlV3yeO5Z6Vmtyq_P-ZdQkIaAn4iEALw_wcB
- **Global Brigades** - https://www.globalbrigades.org/
- The UN Refugee Agency - https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
- Immigration Equality - https://immigrationequality.org/
- International Refugee Assistance Project - https://refugeerights.org/

Climate Organizations
Local

- Physicians for social responsibility - https://psr.org/issues/environment-health/climate-change/
- Sonoran Institute - https://sonoraninstitute.org/
- 350 - https://350.org
- Rising Tide North America - https://risingtidenorthamerica.org/
- Southern Arizona Green For All Coalition - https://www.facebook.com/SAZgreenforall
- Black Water Mesa Coalition - http://www.blackmesawatercoalition.org/
- Environment Arizona - https://environmentamerica.org/arizona/
- Indigenous Environmental Network - https://www.ienearth.org/
- Nizoni Ani, Arizona - https://www.ienearth.org/to-nizoni-ani-arizona/
- **Sierra Club Arizona** - https://www.sierraclub.org/arizona
- Chispa League of Conservation Voters - https://chispalcv.org/ https://www.lcv.org/chispa/
- Earth Works - https://earthworks.org/where-we-work/
- Great Old Broads for Wilderness - https://www.greatoldbroads.org/

- Hopi Tutskwa Permaculture - https://www.hopitutskwa.org/
- Dine Care - https://www.dine-care.org/
- Dine Food Sovereignty - https://www.facebook.com/dinefoodsovereigntyalliance/
- **Northern Arizona Climate Change Alliance** - https://www.nazcca.org/
- ACE Arizona - https://twitter.com/ace_coalition
- Altar Valley Conservation - https://altarvalleyconservation.org/
- Arizona Land and Water Trust - https://www.alwt.org/
- Arizona Native Plant Society - http://www.aznps.com/
- Arizona Sustainability Alliance - https://www.azsustainabilityalliance.com/
- AZ Trail Association - https://aztrail.org/
- Central AZ Land Trust - http://www.centralazlandtrust.org/
- Grand Canyon Trust - http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/
- Indigenous Action - http://www.indigenousaction.org/
- Climate Reality Project - https://www.climaterealityproject.org/content/chapters-map-and-list

National
- The Nature Conservancy - https://www.nature.org/en-us/about-us/where-we-work/united-states/arizona/
- Rising Tide North America - https://risingtidenorthamerica.org/
- Georgetown Climate Center - https://www.georgetownclimate.org/
- Institute for Tribal Environmental Professionals - http://www7.nau.edu/itep/main/Home/
- Water Environment Research Foundation - https://www.waterrf.org/
- Water Utility Climate Alliance - https://www.wucaonline.org/
- Citizens Climate Lobby - https://citizensclimatelobby.org/
- Climate Solutions - https://www.climatesolutions.org/
- ConservAmerica - https://www.conservamerica.org/
- Green Peace - https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/
- Elder's Climate Action
- Mothers Out Front - https://www.mothersoutfront.org/
- Next Gen America - https://nextgenamerica.org/
- Women's Earth Alliance - https://womensearthalliance.org/programs/2010-transformative-advocacy-delegation-southwest/
- **Honor the Earth** - https://honorearth.org/
- **Moms Clean Air Force** - https://www.momscleanairforce.org/

Global
- LAUDATO SI 'MOVEMENT - https://laudatosimovement.org/
- WWF - https://www.worldwildlife.org/

- 350 - 350.org
- Climate Foundation - https://www.climatefoundation.org/
- Green Peace - https://www.greenpeace.org/international/
- Earth Island Institute - https://www.earthisland.org/
- Rainforest Action Network - https://www.ran.org/
- Friends of the Earth - https://www.foei.org/
- Global Footprint Network - https://www.footprintnetwork.org/
- Depave - https://depave.org/
- Earth Day Network - https://www.earthday.org/
- Natural Resources Defense Council - https://www.nrdc.org/
- Rainforest Alliance - https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/
- Earth Justice - https://earthjustice.org/
- Climate Reality Project - https://www.climaterealityproject.org/
- Restore the Earth - https://restoretheearth.org/
- C40 Cities - https://www.c40.org/
- Fairtrade International - https://www.fairtrade.net/
- Earth Works - https://earthworks.org/
- Environmental Defense Fund - https://www.edf.org/
- The Carbon Underground - https://thecarbonunderground.org/
- Green Cross International - https://www.gcint.org/
- Conservation International - https://www.conservation.org/
- Forest Peoples Program - https://www.forestpeoples.org/

Appendix B

Interview Protocol

My name is Sydney Shevat. I am a graduate student in the Applied Criminology graduate program at Northern Arizona University. Thank you for agreeing to speak with me today and also for providing me with the signed consent form stating that I am able to record and transcribe this interview [if applicable: as well as use your role in the organization and the organization's name in the research study]. Do you have any questions about the details provided in that form before we begin?

As a representative of [your organization], I would like to speak with you about climate-induced migration which is the subject of my thesis. More specifically, my research project focuses on how organizations focused on [climate change or migration] approach the causes, consequences, and solutions to climate change induced displacement (CCID). CCID is the process by which people may feel like they must leave their homes or migrate due to environmental degradation.

Some of the questions included in this interview may be difficult to answer and you are not obligated to answer my questions. Please let me know at any time if you would like to skip a question or stop the interview altogether. Also, please feel free to interrupt me if you need clarification or elaboration. There are no right or wrong answers,

I welcome your thoughts as a representative of your organization.

ORGANIZATION / ROLE

- Please describe your organization and the work that it does.

   Prompt: How would you describe the primary mission of your organization as it relates to climate change induced displacement?

- What is your role in your organization?

   Prompt: What is your title?

CAUSES

- While working at your organization, what stories have you heard from or about people who were forced to migrate due to climate change or environmental degradation?

   Prompt: Given the stories told by those your agency serves, what would your organization say are some of the central causes of climate-induced migration?

- Based on your knowledge and experience at your organization, what or who would your organization say is mainly responsible for causing climate change induced displacement?

Prompt: Are nation-states responsible for climate change induced displacement? Are corporations responsible for climate change induced displacement?

- Does your organization focus on the role that inequality plays in climate change induced displacement? If so, please explain.

    Prompt: Do you focus on country of origin, race/ethnicity, class, gender, age

CONSEQUENCES

- How does your organization serve people affected by climate change induced displacement?

    Prompt: What services does your organization provide or what interventions does your organization support?

- What would your organization say are the consequences or impacts of climate change induced displacement?

    Prompt: Were all consequences harmful? What kind of harm occurred? Were there any positive outcomes or impacts?

SOLUTIONS

- What solutions does your organization emphasize for preventing or ending climate change induced displacement?

- Some have suggested that those responsible for climate change and resultant forced migration should be criminalized for their role in environmental harm. How do you think your organization would respond to this idea?

    Prompt: What would criminalizing environmental harm look like for your organization?

- Is your organization considered to be part of a social movement for change? If so, do you collaborate with other organizations or social movements to address climate change induced displacement?

    Prompt: How should groups collaborate? Are there any examples of your organization engaging in collaboration around climate-induced displacement?

- Does your organization engage in work at different levels – local, national, global – to create change [migration or climate change]? Is that also true for your work around climate change induced displacement?

    Prompt: Can you give me an example of local, national, or global work?

- Thanks for answering my questions about how your organization frames the causes, consequences, and solutions to climate change. Is there anything more that you would like to add as a representative of your organization?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME